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The question of the relationship between the teachings of Islam and the principles 
of democracy is, undoubtedly, one of the most pressing issues facing the Muslim world 
today. The principles of elected rulers, consultative bodies, accountability, tolerance, and 
the rule of law are not alien or new to Islam. The purpose of this thesis is to seek the 
elements of compatibility of Islamic principles and practice under democratic 
governance. This comparison is then mirrored and reflected against the governments of 
Malaysia and Indonesia by seeking the influence of Islam and the role it plays in the 
formulation of policies by the government today and in the future to fulfill the call of 
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Islamic resurgence and democratization are two of the most important 
developments of the final decades of the twentieth century. Within these two 
developments the question of the relationship between the teachings of Islam and the 
principles of democracy is, undoubtedly, one of the most pressing issues facing the 
Muslim world today. There is a misconception that Islam and democracy are somehow 
incompatible institutions. On the other hand, there are a growing number of Muslims that 
have called for a pluralist democracy or at least for some of its basic elements. Basing 
upon the Qur’an, there are ample interpretations that had been fully developed by those 
who wish to promote the ideals of democracy and human rights in the Muslim world. 
Contrary to some revolutionary opposition, Islamic movements in Malaysia and 
Indonesia, in the form of political parties or civil organizations have been and continue to 
be active and participate within the framework of the government institutions. In 
Malaysia, the main opposition political party is Islamic based and its objective is to make 
the country an Islamic state. Whereas, Nahdalatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, an 
apolitical Muslim civil organizations plays an influential role in the political systems of 
Indonesia.  
In these two Muslim nations, the leaders and elites embarked on an Islamization 
process in late 1970s and resulted in a more devout Muslims among the population. Even 
though there are a small number of fanatics and extremist Muslims, the majority 
moderate Muslims of both nations prevailed that adheres to democratic principles based 
upon the interpretations of the Qur’an. It is these interpretations that the government of 
both nations is leaning upon in their governance of the country and paving the way 































A. BACKGROUND: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 
Islam is an Arabic word that connotes submission, surrender, and obedience. As a 
religion, Islam stands for complete submission and obedience to Allah and is thus called 
“ISLAM”.1 The word Islam does not convey any such relationship for it does not belong 
to any particular person, people or country. It is neither the product of any human mind 
nor is it confined to any particular community. It is a universal religion and its objective 
is to create and cultivate in man the quality and attitude of Islam. Islam is an attributive 
title and whoever possesses this attribute, may he belong to any race, community, country 
or clan, is a Muslim. According to the Qur’an, the Holy Book of the Muslims, among 
every group and all ages, there have been good and righteous people who possessed this 
attribute and all of them were and are Muslims. 
Every world religion has been named either after the name of its founder or after 
the community and nation in which that religion originated. For instance, Christianity is 
named for the prophet Jesus Christ, Buddhism for its founder Gautama Buddha; 
Zoroastrianism for its founder Zoroaster; and Judaism, the religion of the Jews, for the 
name of the tribe Judah of the country of Judea where it originated. It is the same in the 
case of other religions but not so with Islam. This religion enjoys the unique distinction 
of having no such association with any particular person or peoples.  
All Muslims in the world believe in the Almighty Allah, the sole source and 
sustenance of life; Who alone is worthy of worship and praised; He is lord of the 
beginning of time at the act of creation, to the end of time, on the Day of Judgment. All 
Muslims believe in the Prophet Muhammad as the last messenger and the seal of the 
prophets. Meanwhile, the Qur’an is the complete book of God, which is guarded and 
preserved by Allah. In the pursuit of the path towards salvation, the Qur’an commands 
the performance of certain acts that have become the emblem of the faith and the 
expressions of a communal identity. Central to the religious culture of Islam is the 
                                                 
1 Abul A’la Maududi, “The Meaning of Islam,” in The Muslim World League Journal, Issue No. 7. 
October 2001. 
1 
shari’ah or the divine law as preserved in the Qur’an. Second to the Qur’an is the Sunnah 
or hadith, the term applied to specific reports of the Prophet Muhammad’s words and 
deeds. From the two fundamental sources of scripture and the Prophet’s deeds and 
sayings (sunnah), the ‘ulama or ahl al-‘ilm (people of knowledge) derive the law (fiqh) 
first by establishing rules and procedures which developed as the science of jurisprudence 
or the “roots of the law” (usul al-fiqh). These interpretations resulted in the various 
schools of thought and laws both for the Sunnis and the Shi’a branches of Islam. 
 
B. ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT 
The notion of consensus (ijma’) could be applied to the anonymous agreement on 
points of law among scholars of a particular locale or of a given generation. The scholarly 
consensus for each of the four Sunni legal schools2 (madhahib, s. madhhab) was to be 
able to interpret “Prophetic Traditions” in the manner most appropriate to its own needs. 
Whatever the differences in its method of understanding the divine will, ultimately, has 
been described in modern studies as the “classical theory” of Islamic law and comprised 
the following four roots or principles: the Qur’an (the instrumental input and authorized 
publication), the sunnah of the Prophet as contained in recognized Traditions (the 
environmental input), the method of reasoning by analogy (qiyas), and the consensus 
(ijma’) of scholars of the community. The law finally embraced two broad sets of 
relationships between Allah and humankind (ibadat), and the second, the normative 
relationship between one human being and another (mu’amalat).3 
In Islam, there are a number of very important concepts and events that shaped 
the contemporary visions of what a just society should be. Subsequently, specific 
                                                 
2 Together these four schools comprise the Sunni understanding of the shari’ah. The earliest was Abu 
Hanifah (d.150/767), after whom the Hanafi madhhab is named. A noted exponent of analogy (qiyas), Abu 
Hanifah founded the Hanifah’s school of law. The younger Medinan contemporary of Abu Hanifah, Abu 
‘Abdallah Malik b. Anas, who died in his eighties in 179/795 founded the Maliki school of law. Malik had 
a profound devotion to the Traditions (Hadith) of the Prophet. The next jurist of the quartet was, among his 
contemporaries, the most influential of them all. Abu ‘Absallah Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafii, a descendant 
of the Prophet’s tribe Quraysh, died in 204/820, and the Shafii school of law derived from his name. In 
general, he refined and systematized the legal thinking of his predecessors, including Abu Hanifa and 
Malik, seeking to reduce the range of differences in the theoretical approach to the law. The last legal 
school is the Hanbali School of law, identified with the greatest traditionalist scholar of his time. Ahmad b. 
Hanbal was born in Baghdad and died there in 241/855. Ibn Khalikan claims that he knew a million hadiths 
by heart and his major surviving work is a collection of Traditions numbering around 30,000. 
3 David Waines, “An Introduction to Islam,” Cambridge University Press, New York, 1995, pp. 65-69. 
2 
experiences and historical development of the Islamic community (ummah) have 
indicated that Muslims did not always agree with their rulers and thus there are many 
concepts and teachings that apply to many different contexts for opposition.4 Despite the 
great dynamism and diversity among contemporary Muslims in terms of expressing their 
political views, it demonstrates the foundations for the Islamic perceptions of democracy. 
Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, a significant Sunni Muslim thinker, who established the 
major South Asian Islamic revivalist organization, the Jamaat-I-Islami, stated that the, 
political system of Islam has been based in three principles: Tawheed (Oneness of God), 
Risalat (Prophet hood) and Khilafat (Caliphate). Other Muslim scholars might express 
the issues in a different format, for example according to Sheikh Taha5 
Islam is not too concerned about building a state. Islam, from the 
beginning, was working to build an ummah and there is a big difference 
between building an ummah and building a state. Building an ummah 
means you have certain concepts and values. The Muslim ummah is based 
on three main values: Tawheed (oneness of God), Tazkiy’ah (purification 
of the human being), and Imr’an (building a civilization with values). 
These three values are considered as the main goals of Islam (maqasid al-
sharia) producing a strong ummah. Whereas, a nation is built around a 
piece of land, and not values. 
From the Qur’an verses, (3:159), “and consult with them on the matter,” Qur’an 
(43:38), “those who conduct their affairs by counsel,” Qur’an (42:38) “consultation, 
(shura),” and Qur’an (22:41, 3:104,110), “Enjoining what is good and forbidding what is 
wrong is the responsibility of the state as well as the people in general,” are just a few 
samples from the Holy scriptures that are interpreted to accommodate political thoughts 
towards the democratization of a Muslim society. Accordingly, the “constitution of 
Medina” in Islamic history, outlines the rights and procedures for conflict resolution and 
community action among Muslims, both from Mecca and from Medina, and non-
                                                 
4 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, “ Islam and Democracy”, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1996, p. 40. 
5 Sheikh Taha Jabir Alalwani was born and raised in Iraq. He graduated from Al-Azhar University in 
Cairo in 1959 and obtained his doctorate in 1972. He taught Islamic Jurisprudence for 11 years in Saudi 
Arabia and help to established, the “International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT),” together with the late 
Dr. Ismail al-Faruqi and Dr. Abdulhameed abu-Sulayman in America and is now teaching at the Graduate 
School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) in Leesburg, Virginia. He is also the President of GSISS 
and the Chairman of the Fiqh (Jurisprudence) Council of North America. (Source: Muslim Democrat, 
“Interview with Sheikh Taha,” Published by the Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy (CSID), 
Washington D.C., Volume 4, No.1, January 2002).  
3 
Muslims. Modern Muslims agree that this document and the experience in Medina 
provide the precedents for a pluralistic sociopolitical system in accord with Islamic 
traditions and revelation.6 
 
C. GOVERNING PLURALISTIC MUSLIM NATIONS 
In the Southeast Asian region, in the middle of the 19th century, Holland and 
Britain established their empires in Indonesia and Malaya. The Muslim peoples of this 
region were not yet part of a unified culture or empire, and as Robert Hefner writes 
Few areas of the non-Western world illustrate the legacy and challenge of 
cultural pluralism in a manner more striking than the Southeast Asian 
countries of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Thus, the colonial 
predecessors to these societies, known as British Malaya and the Dutch 
East Indies, were regarded as the locus classieus for the newly minted 
concept of “plural society”.7  
Within this circumstances, secular nationalist, communist, Islamic traditionalist, 
and reformist Islamic movements were pitted against Dutch and British rule, and against 
each other, in the struggle to define Malay- Indonesian societies in the 20th century.8       
There is a perception and fear that democratic change, in Malaysia, Indonesia and 
elsewhere, along with the concern about the rise of Islamic militancy, also results in a rise 
in inter-communal tensions, and inter-religious violence.9 However, other developments 
in Asian countries with majority Muslim populations suggest a strikingly different view 
of the role of Islam in political and social change. For example, in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mass-based organizations, women’s 
rights advocacy groups, and even leading government figures now work to promote 
democratic values, human rights, a free and critical press, religious tolerance, and gender 
equality from an Islamic perspective.10    
                                                 
6 Ibid. Esposito and Voll, p. 40. 
7 Robert W. Hefner, “The Politics of Multiculturalism, Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, 
Singapore and Indonesia,” University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 2001, pp. 4-5. 
8 Ira M. Lapidus, “A History of Islamic Societies,” Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988, p. 
749. 
9 Douglas E. Ramage, “Introduction: Democratic Transitions and The Role of Islam in Asia,” Asian 
Perspectives Series, The Asia Foundation, October 18, 2000, Washington DC. p. 1.  
10 Ibid. 
4 
D. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
From the Islamic political thought and governing a pluralistic Muslim nations 
mentioned above and Islamic political resurgence, the purpose of this thesis is to seek the 
elements of compatibility of Islamic principles and practice under democratic 
governance. This comparison is then mirrored against the governments of Malaysia and 
Indonesia by seeking the influence of Islam on the government today and in the future. 
Islamic movements were formed to challenge some regimes and support others. In 
some areas, Islamist movements are part of the government or are themselves the ruling 
force in the political system. Esposito lists them as: (1) revolutionary opposition to the 
existing political system, (2) legal or co-operating opposition operating within the 
existing political system, (3) active participation in government in alliance or coalition 
with other political forces, and (4) the controlling force in the existing political system.11  
From the above groupings, this thesis will be outlined in the following manner. 
After this introduction, Chapter II will discuss the philosophy of Islam and the concept of 
democracy. Some elements of compatibility found in Islamic interpretation will be 
highlighted. The Islamic movements in Malaysia, which maintain the status of legal 
opposition and participate within a multiparty parliamentary system, will be discussed 
based on these interpretations in Chapter III. Likewise, these interpretations will also be 
discussed in Chapter IV concerning movements that are non-political but actively 
participate in the government in alliance with other political forces. Conclusions follow 
in Chapter V.   
These issues are important because the question of the relationship between the 
teachings of Islam and the principles of democracy is, undoubtedly, one of the most 
pressing issues facing the Muslim world today. There is a misconception that Islam and 
democracy are somehow incompatible institutions. This misconception fails to recognize 
that there are nearly 800 million Muslims living in societies with various degrees of 
democratization. The principles of elected rulers, consultative bodies, accountability, 
tolerance, and the rule of law are not alien or new to Islam. However, for the past 600 
years, these principles were abandoned and authoritarian rulers governed some of the 
                                                 
11 Ibid Esposito and Voll, p. 33. 
5 
Islamic nations. These rulers tried to derive their legitimacy from Islam, and thus 
corrupted its image and forced its views on the government.  
The major questions and arguments put forward that need to be answered are:  
• Do many Muslims today accept the fact that Islam and democracy are 
compatible?  
• What exactly is democracy?  
• How are they compatible?  
• How would it work in an Islamic context?  
• Which form of democracy is preferable?  
• These fundamental questions and many others need to be addressed and 
how this compatibility works in the government of Malaysia and 




II. ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Islamic resurgence and “the third wave” of democratization are two of the most 
important developments of the final decades of the 20th century. The values of these two 
phenomena on civilization are always perceived to clash within the context of western 
liberalism. The debate concerning Islam and democracy is by no means new. Since the 
1980s, this debate has been infused with some fresh thinking and considerable grass roots 
movement. A growing number of Muslims, including a good many Islamic activists, have 
called for a pluralist democracy, or at least for some of its basic elements, such as the rule 
of law, protection of human rights, political participation, government control and 
accountability.12 
There are different interpretations of Islam just as there are different 
interpretations of Christianity and Judaism. It is these interpretations that must be fully 
developed and put forward by those who wish to promote the ideals of democracy and 
human rights in the Muslim world. There is a widely shared assumption that basically 
states that democracy entails secularism, and secularism in the Muslim world has become 
anti-religious. If Muslims are forced to choose between democrats who are against Islam 
and Islamists who are against democracy, then it will always be a “clash of civilization”. 
Democracy will then be adopted in the Muslim world only if it is explained and 
developed from within the Islamic framework. 
Considerable interest is being showed and debates are taking place now where 
democracy and Islam are subjects of great controversy, and particularly, in Arab and 
Muslim nations. There is an apparent dilemma in Islam as well. On the one hand God 
states that, “those who denounce Allah’s wishes and decrees are the Unbelievers”. On the 
other hand, Allah or his Prophet do not tell us how we are supposed to rule according to 
His decrees or who is suppose to have the authority as to what those decrees really 
mean.13  
                                                 
12 Gudrun Kramer, “Islamist Notions of Democracy,” in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., Political 
Islam, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1997, p. 71. 
7 
13 Dr. Radwan Masmoudi, “Islam and Democracy: Between the Past, Present and the Future,” Talk 
In this chapter, the author would like to state his opinion that the principles of 
Islam are compatible with democracy but are dependant on how these principles are 
interpreted (ijtihad), and how these interpretations are adopted in the governing styles of 
Muslim nations. There was an assumption, on the contrary, that is shared not only by 
some Islamists who rejects democracy, but also by different proponents of democracy, 
both liberals and others alike, who want to take Islam out of politics. There are also those 
Muslims who believe that democracy has no place in Islam, while many believe that a 
nation cannot be Islamic without being democratic. In extracting the elements of 
compatibilities of democracy vis-à-vis Islam, it is only logical to understand superficially 
the historical aspect and what Islam means in a Muslim society. 
 
1. Brief Historical Roots of Islam    
The word Islam means, “the willing and active recognition of and submission to 
the command of the One, Allah,” and Prophet Muhammad is His Messenger (al-rasul), 
and a guide for his people and all humankind.14 People who practice this faith are 
Muslims. The prophetic mission of Prophet Muhammad was not simply the continuation 
of the Jewish and Christian religious traditions, but the culmination of all previous 
revelations from Allah. God sent Muhammad as the final Messenger, “the last seal of the 
prophets” (Qur’an 33:40), and gave him the Qur’an, the revelation of God’s will, in its 
final and complete form. 
The Qur’an and the Prophet provide the fundamental sources for the Straight Path 
(Shari’ah or Islamic law) of Muslim life. Born in 570, but orphaned at a young age, 
Prophet Muhammad belonged to the Hashemite clan of the Quraysh tribe. In 622, 
Prophet Muhammad migrated (hijrah) to Yathrib, later renamed Medina (City of the 
Prophet) and under his guidance, Islam in Medina crystallized as both a faith and a 
sociopolitical system.15 From 622-632, the Muslim community expanded and established 
its hegemony over Central Arabia. The old tribal system of loyalties and values was 
                                                 
delivered at Algiers, during the International Conference on Islam and Democracy organized by the High 
Council of Algeria, on March 20-22, 2000.  
14 David Waines, “An Introduction to Islam,” Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1995, 
pp. 2-3.  
15 John L. Esposito, “Islam and Politics,” Third Edition, Syracuse University Press, 1994, pp. 5-6.  
8 
reformed and Islamized.16 The era is described in Islamic tradition as the “age of 
ignorance” (al-jahiliyyah).17 The term occurs in the Qur’an, not as a past period of time, 
but rather as a dynamic psychological state of mind being challenged by the new moral 
force of the message of Prophet Muhammad. This led Prophet Muhammad to be 
cautioned and advised:  
Never will the Jews be pleased with you, nor yet the Christians, unless you 
follow their own creeds. Say: “Behold the guidance of Allah is the only 
true guidance.” (Qur’an 2:120).18 
The death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 plunged the community into two 
successive political crises involving political authority, the issue of succession and the 
problem of political fragmentation. One fraction, the Sunnis (Arabic word for custom or 
use), felt that the Caliphate (Khalifah, Arabic word for successor) should be chosen, as 
Arab’s customarily were, by election. Therefore, they supported the succession of the 
first four or “Rightly Guided Caliphs (RGC), Abu Bakr, ‘Uthman, ‘Umar and ‘Ali, who 
had been Prophet Muhammad’s companions. The other groups thought that Muhammad 
should chose his cousin, son-in-law and the 4th caliph, Ali as his immediate heirs, and 
that succession should be through his bloodline. In 680, one of Ali’s sons, Hussein, living 
in Medina led a rebellion against the ruling Umayyad caliph, Yazid. Hussein refused to 
recognize Yazid’s legitimacy as caliph. However, Hussein did not receive the expected 
popular support and during the battle of Karbala, Hussein and his small army were 
surrounded and defeated by the Umayyad army. Hussein’s martyrdom began the Shi’a, or 
sometimes called shi’ite, movement, whose name comes from a word meaning “partisan 
of Ali”.19  
From the modest origins in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in the 7th century, the universal 
community of Muslims today comprises around one billion believers living in almost 55 
countries worldwide. Muslims form a majority of the population in more than 40 
                                                 
16 Ibid. p. 7. 
17 Ibid. David Waines, p. 27. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell and Margaret W. Sullivan, “ Change and the Muslim World”, 
Syracuse University Press, 1981. p. 6.  
9 
countries and are the second largest community numerically after Christianity.20 The 
Shi’a and the Sunnis are the two major branches of Muslims, with the Sunnis comprising 
about 90% of the total. Cutting across these sects is Sufism, which is a mystical strain of 
Islam that reflects the need, felt by many Muslims, to realize in their personal experience, 
the living presence of God. The differences between these two major sects are not so 
much in belief, which are fundamentally the same for both, but rather in practice, 
interpretation and political theory. 
In the Sunni tradition, the conventional genealogy of modern Islamic thought 
begins with Sayyid Jamal al-Din al- Afghani (1839-97). His political career included 
activity in Egypt, Iran and the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-
1905) was a young associate of Sayyid Jamal al-Din in Egypt during the 1870s and 
1880s. They spoke against the foreign economic and political domination of Egypt that 
culminated in the British invasion and occupation in 1882. After being exiled in Paris, he 
returned to Egypt and eventually became Chief Mufti (Jurisconsult) of Egypt.21  
Abduh occupied himself with reforming the teaching of Arabic and understanding 
of Islam, arguing that a proper understanding and implementation of the moral and 
ethical principles of Islam were compatible with the adoption of modern science and 
technology.  
Rashid Rida (1865-1935), who came to Egypt from Tripoli, Lebanon, was 
Muhammad ‘Abduh’s most influential student. Rida promoted the Salafiyya Movement, 
a neotraditionalist orientation that restricted what was to be regarded as “correct” in Islam 
to the Qur’an and the hadith or reports about the words and deeds of Prophet Muhammad 
during the period of Prophet Muhammad’s life and the reign of the first four RGC.  
The Salafiyya Movement influenced many ulama (Muslim Scholars) in the Sunni 
Arab world. Among them is Hasan al-Banna (1906-49), an Egyptian schoolteacher who 
established the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jam’iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) in 1928. It 
is the largest and most influential Islamic organization in the Sunni Arab world. An 
b, one of the leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood offshoot of this is Sayyid Qut
                                                 
20 Ibid, David Waines, p. 1. 
21 Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, “Political Islam,” University of California Press, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, California, 1997, p. 5. 
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executed in 1966, whose writings and political thoughts inspired many radical Islamist 
movements of the 1970s. His “Milestone” stipulates that Islam stands for change and it 
seeks this change in the individual and society. This change covers every aspect of 
human life, from personal morality to business, economics and politics.22           
 
2. The Political Framework of Islam 
Islam claims it transcends the narrow meaning of religion and encompasses every 
aspect of human life making it a complete guiding system for human society. 
Furthermore, it also claims to be the final version of the monotheistic tradition of 
religions, and as such with Islam, the divine intervention comes to an end forever. From 
the Qur’an come the terms, shura (advisory council), hizb (party), Tawhid (Oneness), 
Mustadaf (oppressed), ummah (community of believers), and Jahiliyya (ignorance), 
which are interpreted in a modern political context (democracy, political parties, a 
classless society and so on).23 Claiming to be the true and final religion, Islamic 
philosophy of governance is based on the three principles of Tawhid (Onemess of Allah), 
Risala (Prophethood) and Khilifa (Caliphate).24 
Tawhid means that one Allah alone is the Creator, Sustainer and Master of the 
universe and all that exists in it. This principle of the Oneness in Allah makes 
meaningless the concept of the legal and political sovereignty of human beings. No 
individual, family, class or race can set himself or herself above Allah. Allah alone is the 
ruler and His commandments constitute the law of Islam.   
Risala is the medium through which the law of Allah is received. Two things 
from this source have been received: the Qur’an, the book in which Allah has expounded 
His law, and the authoritative interpretation and exemplification of that Book by the 
Prophet, through word and deed, in his capacity as the representative of Allah. The 
Qur’an laid down the broad principles on which human life should be based and the 
                                                 
22 Sayyid Qutb, “Milestone,” Publish by the Mother Mosque Foundation, Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52406 
and printed in the United States.  
23 Olivier Roy translated by Carol Volk, “The Failure of Political Islam,” Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994. p. 39. 
24 These principles are extracted from the speech by the late Syed Abul A’la Mawdudi. 
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Prophet of Allah, in accordance with these principles, established a model system of 
Islamic life. The combination of these two is called the Shari’ah (law). 
Khilifa means “representation”. Man, according to Islam, is the representative of 
Allah on earth, His vice-regent. By virtue of the powers delegated to him by Allah, within 
the limits prescribed, he is required to exercise Divine authority. 
To illustrate this meaning, consider the case of an estate in your name in which 
someone else has been appointed to administer on your behalf. Four conditions invariably 
are realized. First, the real ownership of the estate remains vested in you and not the 
person administering the estate. Second, he administers your property directly in 
accordance with your instructions. Third, he exercises his authority within the limits 
prescribe by you, and fourth, in the administration of the trust, he executes your will and 
fulfils your intentions and not his own. Any representation that does not fulfill these four 
conditions will be an abuse of authority and breaking the covenant, which was implied in 
the concept of “representation”. This is what Islam means when it affirms that man is the 
representative (Khalifa) of Allah on earth. The state that is established in accordance with 
this political theory will, in fact, be a caliphate under that sovereignty of Allah, which 
could be interpreted in modern terminology to signify a leader.       
 
3. Democracy in Islam 
The first incident of “democratic” political method in Islamic history was shown 
by the Prophet at Jirana on the track leading back to Mecca after withdrawing from Taif 
with the captured families and the flocks of Hawazin.25 Consensus (ijma) and 
consultation (shura) with the various heads of the tribe were attributed to the release of 
the Hawazin families. This democratic principle was utilized after the death of Prophet 
Muhammad in 632 when Abu Bakr, the first RGC, was elected to be the Prophet’s 
successor or Khalifah.26   
Political philosophy, be it in Islam or democracy, revolves around, “power and 
authority” and claiming the legitimate right to rule, manage and oversee peoples’ 
                                                 
25 Sir John Glubb, “The Life and Times of Muhammad,” Published by Madison Books Lanham, 
Maryland, 1998, p. 326. 
26 Ibid. p. 367. 
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affairs.27 However, in Islamic terms, sovereignty is with God and man is the vicegerent 
and an agent on earth. After the Prophet Muhammad, this so called agent can be called 
Caliphate, Prime Minister, Head of State or President depending upon the style of 
governance. Whatever he may be called; his governing will be bonded by Shari’ah law. 
Sayyid Qutb expounded upon this and says that, “By the Shari’ah of God is meant 
everything legislated by God for ordering man’s life; it includes the principles of belief, 
principles of administration and justice, principles of morality and human relationships, 
and principles of knowledge.”28    
Legitimacy of political authority is endorsed by the rights of individuals who 
endorsed the representatives to oversee their interests, and sociopolitical and economic 
well-being.  As Weber describes it, “Politics for us means striving to share power or 
striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups 
within a state.”29 Therefore, citizens are the owners of the state and the collective 
representation, which is called the government. This is the philosophy of the modern 
political theory of constitution and liberal democracy.  
By the end of the 20th century, the subjective definition of democracy by scholars 
evolved and was interpreted as various universal standards. Democracy now is thought 
of, as a citizen’s inherent political right to participate in the governing system irrespective 
of their ethnicity, social status or gender. Liberal democracy is now accepted as the most 
popular and universal system of government, or “as the only game in town”. 
 
4. Theories of Democracy 
Democracy does not connote a single or a univocal term. It has been used to 
describe a form of governing system that has generated intellectual debates dating back to 
ancient Greece but which became a theme of “political influence” in most Western 
industrialized countries. This successful style of governing is a system with a healthy 
                                                 
27 Md. Moniruzamman, “Islam and Democracy: The Underlying Philosophy,” A paper presented 
during the 2nd Annual Conference of the Center for the Study & Democracy (CSID) on, Islam, Democracy 
and the Secularist State in the Post-Modern Era held at Georgetown University, Washington D.C. on 
Saturday April 7 2001. p. 91. 
28 Ibid. Sayyid Qutb, p. 107. 
29 H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, “From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,” Oxford University 
Press, Inc, New York, 1946, p. 78. 
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political culture where power is originated from the ordinary citizens to whom the 
governing agencies are responsible. Due to the interdependent nature of the world today, 
developing countries have become not only a test ground of such influence, but also have 
been obliged and pressured to conform to the western political system in order to be 
recognized as legitimate in international society. After the demise of socialist 
alternatives, liberal democracy has appeared to be the most accepted form of 
government.30  
The traditional and simplest expression of democracy as a system of “government 
by the people, of the people, for the people” might satisfy a statesman like Abraham 
Lincoln but not the sophisticated scholars and experts which differs on defining the 
concept. Political scientists have proposed more complicated and sophisticated theories. 
Diamond (1999) listed democratic norms in the following terms:  
Democracy is instrumental to freedom in three ways: First, free and fair 
elections inherently require certain political rights of expression, 
organization, and opposition. Second, democracy maximizes the 
opportunities for self-determination, and Third, it facilitates moral 
autonomy, the ability of each individual citizen to make normative choices 
and thus to be self-governing.31 
Lijphart meanwhile put forward two models of how democracy can be organized 
and run. The first model, “government by and for the people” is via the “the majority of 
the people” which is the essence of the majoritarian model of democracy and the 
alternative model of government, “as many people as possible,” which is the crux of the 
consensus model.32 He elaborated and explained the various patterns of democratic rule 
in 36 countries by classifying them into two dimensions or namely, “executive-parties 
dimension,” and “federal-unitary dimension.”33 Lijhart also supported the eight criteria of 
defining and measuring democracy proposed by Robert A. Dahl in his “Polyarchy” 
(1971, 3): (1) the right to vote, (2) the right to be elected, (3) the right of political leaders 
                                                 
30 Ibid. Md. Moniruzzaman, p. 92. 
31 Larry Diamond, “Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation,” The John Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1999, p. 3.  
32 Arend Lijphart, “Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries,” Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999, pp. 1-8. 
33 Ibid. 
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to compete for support and votes, (4) elections that are free and fair, (5) freedom of 
association, (6) freedom of expression, (7) alternative sources of information, and (8) 
institutions for making public policies depend on votes and other expressions of 
preference.34       
Meanwhile Linz and Stepan believed that consolidated democracies need to have 
five interacting arenas in place to reinforce one another in order for such consolidation to 
exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated: First, the conditions must exist for 
the development of a free and lively civil society. Second, there must be a relatively 
autonomous and valued political society. Third, there must be a rule of law to ensure 
legal guarantees for the freedoms of citizens and an independent association life. Fourth, 
there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government. Fifth, 
there must be an institutionalized economic society.35  
Nevertheless, it can be argued that it is the liberal democracy in various guises 
and to varying degrees that dominates discussions of democracy today. It is a form that 
has its roots in those countries which are the main advocates and inheritors of liberal 
tradition: Western Europe, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the 
nonwestern nations of Japan and South Korea. Also, it is this form of democracy that the 
United States has listed, “to promote democracy and human rights abroad,” as one of the 
three core objectives. This was initiated by President Reagan and followed by President 
Clinton, and resulted in pursuing a forward-looking National Security Strategy for the 
new century by deriving these objectives from the report submitted in accordance with 
section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986.36  
However, such liberal democracy, having its root in western civilization, could 
not avoid severe criticism and resistance from some other civilizations, especially Islam. 
Hundreds of years after the original development and consolidation of democracy around 
the world, Muslims nations, therefore, still are examining the compatibility and 
                                                 
34 Ibid. pp. 48-49. 
35 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “ Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,” The John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1996, pp. 7-15. 
36 President Bill Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for the New Century,” Produced by the White 
House, December 1999, p. 25. 
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incompatibility between Islam and democracy, and this is demonstrated by the degree of 
resistance Islamic societies have created.             
 
5. The Theory and Practice of Democracy in Islam 
The above explanation of the term khilafa also makes it clear that no individual or 
dynasty or class can be Khalifa. The authority of Khilafa is bestowed on the whole of any 
community, which is ready to fulfill the conditions of representation after subscribing to 
the principles of Tawhid and Risala. Such a society carries the responsibility of the 
Khilafa as a whole and each one of its individuals share in it.  
This is the point where democracy begins in Islam. Every individual in an Islamic 
society enjoys the rights and powers of the caliphate of Allah and in this respect all 
individuals are equal. No one may deprive anyone else of his/her rights and powers. The 
agency of running the affairs of the state will be formed by agreement with these 
individuals, and the authority of the state will only be an extension of the powers of the 
individuals delegated to it. Their opinion will be decisive in the formation of the 
government, which will be run with their advice and in accordance with their wishes. 
Whoever gains their confidence will undertake the duties and obligations of the caliphate 
on their behalf, and when he loses this confidence, he will have to step down. In this 
respect, the political system of Islam demands and is subjected to accountability and 
responsibility. 
What distinguishes Islamic democracy from Western democracy, therefore, is that 
the latter is based on the concept of popular sovereignty, while Islam rests on the 
principle of a popular Khilafa. In Western democracy, the people are sovereign, while in 
Islam, sovereignty is vested in Allah and the people are His caliphs or representatives. In 
Western democracy, the people make their own rules and laws. In Islam, the Shari’ah 
laws given by Allah through His Prophet must be followed. In one system, the 
government undertakes to fulfill the will of the people, while in the other; the government 
and the people have to fulfill the will of Allah.   
In trying to form the government, the basic Islamic principles in the government 
are, first, the source from which the ruler draws his/her authority which is the public will. 
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The ruler cannot claim divine right to rule the people nor can he force himself on the 
people. Secondly, the ruler has to rule through participation and consultation (shura) with 
the people or those whom the people elect as their representatives. In the past, the 
representatives were the leaders of the tribe (ahl al-hal wal aqd). Today, they clearly 
must be elected. Third, authority must be used to secure justice for all, without any 
discrimination. All citizens must have their rights protected, and especially the weakest in 
the society. Oppression (dhulm) is strongly forbidden.37  
The Islamic approach to human rights is those rights granted by Allah. Rights 
granted by Kings or legislature assemblies can be withdrawn as easily as they are 
conferred; but no individual or institution has the authority to withdraw the rights 
conferred by Allah.38 The charter and the proclamations and the resolutions of the United 
Nations cannot be compared with the rights sanctioned by Allah. The former are not 
obligatory on anybody, while the latter are an integral part of Islamic faith. All Muslims 
and all administrators who claim to be Muslim have to accept, recognize and enforce 
them. The verdict of the Holy Qur’an is unequivocal: “Those who do not judge by what 
Allah has sent down are the disbelievers (Kafirun).” (5:44)  
The following verse also proclaims: “They are the wrong-doers (zalimoon)”. 
(5:45) “They are the perverse and the law-breakers (fasiqoon).” (5:47). 
In other words, if temporal authorities regard their own words and decisions as 
right and those given by Allah as wrong, they are disbelievers. If, on the other hand, they 
regard Allah’s commands as right but deliberately reject them in favor of their own 
decisions, then they are wrongdoers. Law-breakers are those who disregard the bond of 
allegiance. 
All these Islamic principles can be practically implemented through democracy. 
Such democratic principles and ideals as human and civil rights, representation, free and 
fair elections and separation of powers are examples of how democracy can be 
implemented using Islamic principles in government and fulfill the goals of Shari’ah. 
nty, whether it belongs to God or the people, is merely The argument about sovereig
                                                 
37 Dr. Fathi Osman, “Democracy as a Contemporary Implementation of Islam,” Conference Report, 
Published by CSID, Washington D.C. Volume 3, No. 1, April 2001, p. 8.   
38 Ibid. Speech by Mawdudi. 
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theoretical since God has created men and women as His vicegerents (khalifa) on earth as 
explained by Sayyid Qutb.  
 
6. Islam and The State 
There is a general agreement among Muslims scholars39 that Islam is 
comprehensive, or as stated by the commonly used modern formula, that it is a religion 
and state (al-islam din wa dawla) or religion and world (al-islam din wa dunnya)40 or the 
principle of non-separation between religion and politics (din wa siyasa).41 According to 
these authors, Islam comprises faith, ethics and law set forth in the Qur’an, exemplified 
by the life of Prophet Muhammad (the Sunnah) and later developed by Muslim 
theologians and jurists (the ulama and fuqaha) into the shari’ah. To apply the shari’ah 
requires social organization and a state. However, God in his wisdom left the details of 
political organization to the Muslim community to decide according to its needs and 
aspirations. 
If government organization is a matter of convenience and mere techniques, then 
the adoption of democracy may be acceptable, recommended and mandatory provided 
this does not lead to the neglect or violation of Islamic norms and values.42 At the core of 
this agreement are shared assumptions that all people are born equal, having been 
installed as God’s vicegerents on earth, that government exists to ensure an Islamic life 
and enforce Islamic law, that sovereignty (siyada, hakimiyya) ultimately rests with God 
alone, who has made the law and defined good and evil (al-ma’ruf wa’l-munkar), the licit 
and the illicit (al-halal wa’l-haram), that the authority (sulta) to apply God’s law has 
been transferred to the community as a whole and that the head of the community or 
state, no matter whether he be called imam, caliph or president, is the mere 
representative, agent or employee of the community that elects, supervises and if 
                                                 
39 These are Sunni Arab mainstream thinkers, including members of the Egyptian and the Jordanian 
Muslim Brothers and the Tunisian Islamist Movement, led by Rashid al-Ghannoushi (formerly the 
movement de la Tendance Islamique and Hizb al-Nahda, as well as individual authors committed to the 
Islamic awakening (al-sahwa al-ifdamiya) such as Muhammad ‘Imara, Muhamamd Salim al-Awwa, Fahmi 
Huwaydi, Fathi ‘Uthman and others. 
40 Ibid. Gudrum Kramer, p. 73. 
41 Ibid. Olivier Roy, p. 62. 
42 Ibid. Gudrum Kramer, p. 75. 
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necessary, disposes him, either directly or via its representatives.43 Disagreement 
(ikhtilaf) is allowed in Islam. Two important ideas set the conceptual limits in the Islamic 
heritage for disagreement and opposition: fitnah (civil disorder) and ikhtilaf 
(disagreement). Fitnah is being condemned and ikhtilaf is allowed in the Muslim 
community.44  
The Islamic state was never a theocracy that claims a divine right over the people. 
Modern Islamic thinkers such as Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi (d.1899), Abdel Rahman al-
Kawakibi (d. 1902), Mohammad Abduh (d. 1905) and even Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi 
(d.1979), after considerable reservation, said 
Democracy is congruent with the teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. 
It simply means that the country does not belong to a particular person, 
class, or group but to all those people who live in it. Therefore, its 
administrative system should fall in line with the wishes of all these 
peoples, or at least of the majority of them. Their right to elect leaders, by 
the exercise of their free will and to replace them in a similar manner 
should be conceded in principle.45 
The holy Qur’an clearly states that the aim and purpose of this state is the 
establishment, maintenance and development of those virtues with which the Creator 
wishes human life to be enriched, and the prevention and eradication of those evils in 
human life, which He finds abhorrent. The Islamic state is intended neither solely as an 
instrument of political administration nor for the fulfillment of the collective will of any 
particular set of people. Rather, Islam places a high ideal before the state for the 
achievement of how it must use all the means at its disposal. 
The constant demand made by Islam is that the principles of morality must be 
observed at all costs and in all walks of life. Hence, it lays down as an unalterable policy 
that the state should base its policies on justice, truth and honesty. It is not prepared, 
under any circumstances, to tolerate fraud, falsehood and injustice for the sake of 
political, administrative or national expediency. Whether it is relations between the rulers 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. Esposito and Voll, p. 41. 
45 Ibid. Dr. Fathi Osman, Conference Report, p. 8. 
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and the ruled within the state, or the relations of the state with other states, precedence 
must always be given to truth, honesty and justice.46 
A shura (advisory council) is also elected by the people to assist and guide the 
amir (leader). It is incumbent on the amir to administer his country with the advice of this 
shura. The amir may retain office only so long as he enjoys the confidence of the people 
and must relinquish it when he loses that confidence. Every citizen has the right to 
criticize the amir and his government and all reasonable means for the expression of 
opinion must be made available.47                   
In Islam, the judiciary is not placed under the control of the executive. It derives 
its authority directly from the Shari’ah and is answerable to Allah. The government 
appoints the judges but once a judge occupies the bench, he must administer justice 
impartially according to the law of Allah. The organs and functionaries of the 
government are not outside his legal jurisdiction so that even the highest executive 
authority of the government is liable to be called upon to appear in a court of law as a 
plaintiff or defendant. Rulers and ruled are subject to the same law and there can be no 
discrimination on the basis of position, power or privilege. Islam stands for equality, and 
scrupulously adheres to this principle in social, economic and political realms alike.  
In Islam, the rights of citizenship are not confined to people born in a particular 
state. A Muslim ipso facto becomes the citizen of an Islamic state as soon as he sets foot 
on its territory with the intention of living there and thus enjoys equal rights along with 
those who acquire citizenship by birth. Every Muslim is to be regarded as eligible for 
positions of the highest responsibility in an Islamic state without distinction of race, color 
or class.48 
Islam has also laid down certain rights for non-Muslims who may be living within 
the boundaries of an Islamic state and these rights must form part of the Islamic 
constitution. In Islamic terminology, such non-Muslims are called dhimmis (the 
covenanted), implying that the Islamic state has entered into a covenant with them and 
                                                 




guaranteed their protection. The life, property and honor of a dhimmis are to be respected 
and protected in exactly the same way as that of a Muslim citizen. There is no difference 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim citizen with respect to civil or criminal law.49 
The Islamic state may not interfere with the personal rights of non-Muslims, who 
have full freedom of conscience and belief and are at liberty to perform their religious 
rites and ceremonies in their own way. Not only may they propagate their religion, they 
are even entitled to criticize Islam within the limits laid down by law and decency.50 
Within multi-religious Third World societies, democracy may sometimes 
precipitate conflict rather than prevent it. The Ivory Coast in West Africa has more 
Muslims than Christians. Muslims have been under-represented in the political 
institutions throughout the postcolonial period. However, the Muslims were better off 
when the Ivory Coast was a one-party state under a Christian leader (Felix Houphouet-
Boigny) than they are now that the Ivory Coast is a multiparty system with Christians 
more terrified of Muslim numerical strength at the polls.51 
In Nigeria, more people have been killed in Christian-Muslim clashes since 
Nigeria’s return to democratic civilian rule in 1999 than were killed in such clashes in the 
preceding 10 years of military rule. The debates about instituting the Shari’ah in some 
Northern Nigerian states have been non-violent in most of the North, but the Kaduna 
state especially experienced one of the worst outbursts of sectarian bloodshed in less than 
a year after civilian rule was restored in Nigeria. Hundreds of people were killed in 2000, 
and thousands were displaced.52          
So how can an Islamic society be established? Disagreement between Muslim 
scholars has existed on this point throughout the history of Islam. Most acknowledge the 
necessity of controlling political power. The moderates are partisans of re-Islamization 
from the bottom up through preaching, establishing sociocultural movements while 
pressuring the leaders, in particular through political alliances, to promote Islamization 
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from the top by introducing the shari’ah into legislation. This was the politics of the 
founding fathers, Al-Banna and Mawdudi, who accepted the notion of revolt only if the 
state took a resolutely anti-Islamic stance and if all means of peaceful protest had been 
exhausted.53  
Meanwhile, radicals consider that compromise with current Muslim society is not 
possible. They advocate political rupture and introduce the concept of revolution. Sayyid 
Qutb put this concept forward. He fashioned himself as the theoretician of rupture and 
inspired the revolutionary groups of the 1970s. His analysis turns upon two concepts of 
jahiliyya and takfir or excommunication, which is the act of declaring that someone who 
professes Islam is in fact, an infidel or kafir. Moderate Islamists reject the concept of 
excommunication, by considering, in the tradition of the ulamas, that an unjust power is 
preferable to a division in the community (fitna).54          
 
B. CONCLUSION 
From the argument put forward by all Muslim scholars, ultimately, it is the 
interpretations of the principles of Islam that will maneuver the Muslim nations into the 
form of government seen fit for modern society in this century. Since democracy is the 
“only game in town”, there is ample guidance from the Qur’an and the Sunnah to 
accommodate Muslim nations adopting democratic values towards governing a state 
without straying from the given shariah. Potential leaders of Muslim nations must be 
decisive and adoptive in order to play the current political game of this century while also 
being able to convince the ummah and the population of the requirements in order to be at 
par or be able to demand the equal right of the state in world communities. As Esposito 
states, “As Muslim rulers and politicians, whatever their degree of religiosity or 
ideological orientation, have always had to contend with the political sensitivity of Islam, 
and like it or not, they must contend with popular support for democratization.”55 
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If Islam recognizes “consultation” and “difference of opinion” as salient political 
features of the Muslim community, then it should not be surprised to see that these 
principles are developed over time through the amelioration of liberated rationality into a 
political philosophy called “democracy”.56  
No one can deny that for the last few centuries, Muslims have been steadily 
loosing the historical race. The torch of civilization and humanity has been passed on to 
other nations and other peoples because of misinterpretation, rigidity and going against 
the wave of democratization. This has resulted in Muslims not being the principal 
beneficiaries of the modern world, which is not their creation. One need not haggle over 
the claim either that the issues of global justice and interstate morality must be squarely 
addressed if the current world-order is to retain a modicum of legitimacy and ensure its 
survival as a community of nations. Similarly, one cannot be lax in underscoring the 
urgency and immensity of the task ahead for Muslims to interpret the Qur’an to the best 
of their ability for the good of the state. Ayatollah Khomeini a Shi’i even espoused during 
his rule the Sunni concept of, “public interest (maslahah), a doctrine that permitted the 
state to violate citizens’ rights for the common good and for Islam’s long term 
interests,”57 if Muslims intend to become movers of history again.  
Any future revival of Islam as a faith and civilization would certainly require an 
abundance of will, sacrifice and devotion. It would indisputably be contingent upon all 
the resources of intellect and imagination, and it cannot do without a resolute 
commitment to common humanity and universal morality. To indulge in a politics of 
despair and advocate the creation of an alternate world system is sheer madness. Islam as 
a revealed faith is based on the acceptance of the ultimately transcendent nature of truth 
and reality. Islam does not equal democracy, but certainly elements of it can be adopted 
and as long as there is a commitment to moral authority, and the sources of Islam remain 
guarded and not manipulated, then democratic approaches to government appear to be 
quite Islamic.      
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III. THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN MALAYSIA 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In many areas of the Muslim world, including Malaysia and Indonesia, one of the 
crucial issues defining their political future is the relationship between the forces of 
Islamic resurgence and the development of democratic political systems. Governments 
and political leaders throughout these Muslim worlds will then walk a thin line to try to 
balance their act between responding to popular sentiments for greater political 
participations and at the same time accommodating the activities of these religious 
movements. As Esposito and Voll mentioned 
Rulers and regimes are forced to choose among policies of repression and 
greater popular participation, with the threat that if they make the wrong 
choice, they themselves could lose power. Islamic movements and their 
leaders face similar critical choice between adaptable or violent 
opposition.58  
In Malaysia, in contrast to some revolutionary opposition and the subsequent 
creation of new political systems, Islamic movements have been and continue to be active 
and participate within the framework of the existing political systems. With the recent 
incident of September 11, 2001 in New York, a few Muslim nations were mentioned and 
criticized by the United States (US) and its allies for failing to clamp down on Islamic 
militants. When looking at political change in Malaysia, the Western nations were 
perplexed when, “it seems to be Islamic political parties that are pushing against the 
perceived authoritarianism of the Mahathir regime.”59 The democratization movement in 
Malaysia is even more complicated for outsiders because the leader of this country is a 
woman who covers herself. How can that be compatible with outside concepts of 
democratization and the strengthening of civil society?60  
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As Esposito, pointed out  
Transnational activist movements have very limited visibility and appeal, 
when one examines the experiences of the new Islamic movements and 
their relationships with the processes of democratization. It is the national 
movements, which seek to Islamize the existing political units that are of 
greatest importance.61  
These movements in turn will provide a basis of understanding between the 
relationship between Islamic resurgence and democratization. Factors such as the legality 
of the movements, the degree of the society’s involvement in local politics, the reaction 
of governing political leaders of the country and the interference or support of external 
big powers towards these societies and movements will determine this relationship. 
External interference was illustrated by the US with the downfall of the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda’s movement.   
In the Muslim world, defining “Islamic democracy” is always being contested and 
challenged in a way that is appropriate both in the demands of increasing popular 
political participation and in the desire to establish a clearly and authentically Islamic 
polity.62 Confronted with rising Islamic opposition, Malaysian Prime Minister (PM), Dr. 
Mahathir bin Mohamad, faces a democracy with complex connections. In Malaysia, 
Islam is the official religion but the freedom of religion is complete. While trying to 
provide some guarantees to the electorate, the PM is cautious and careful not to burn any 
bridges with the West, which is economically and geopolitically vital for this modest 
country. The PM had to tread lightly between two competing temptations of the Muslim 
world. One was confessional/religious confinement and the other was cultural alienation. 
As the PM pointed out during an interview on Muslim terrorism63 
We have seen the emergence of a group comprising Muslims who want to 
turn Malaysia into what they call an Islamic state. As they could not 
impose themselves through the ballot boxes, they tried to topple my 
government. 
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Pertaining to development, he says 
In every Muslim community, you will find a minority of the people who 
would like to create an Islamic state and will try to stop the government 
from developing the country economically. Instead of encouraging 
Muslims to study, to acquire skills, they just told them to study religion 
and nothing else. 
Concerning Muslim faith, he states 
Today, certain extremists distort these teachings to serve their personal 
and political ambition. An Islamic country works on achieving 
development and peace, it wants to maintain good relations between the 
communities. 
Touching on ethnicity, he says 
It is necessary to maintain a balance in the levels of economic 
development between the different ethnic groups in Malaysia to ensure its 
stability. Giving up a part of our potential growth so as to maintain a 
peaceful domestic environment constitutes a necessary judgment.    
With the anecdote from the Malaysian PM, the impact of Islam, pluralism and the 
Malay Sultanate in Malaysia will be elaborated on in this chapter followed by a 
discussion on Islam as a source of legitimacy for Malay politics. The emergence and the 
influence of Islamic societies upon Malaysian politics will then be discussed as will, 
lastly, the impact of all these issues on democratic governance, human and women’s 
rights and race relations in Malaysia.     
 
B. ISLAM, PLURALISM AND THE MALAY SULTANATE 
Islam in Malaysia, embraced by about 55% of the country’s 22 million people, is 
both a religion and ethnic identity because most Muslims in the country are also Malays. 
Though Islam is the religion of half the country’s population, its influence on Malaysian 
life is central given the political and cultural pre-dominance of the Malay-Muslim 
population.64 The remaining population of Malaysia is comprised of ethnic Chinese 
(35%), ethnic Indians (8%) and small indigenous groups (2%). The Muslims in Malaysia 
are predominantly from the madhhab Al-Shafii. During the early years, the practice of 
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Islam in Malaysia was embedded in the local cultures, and in particular, Buddhism and 
Hinduism, that have been important pre-Islamic influences in Malaysia. Therefore, inter-
ethnic and inter-religious coalition parties, whether in opposition or as ruling parties, has 
dominated the country’s electoral politics in post-independence politics. 
Politically, Malaysia is remarkable because it is the only Southeast Asian country, 
aside from Singapore, that has held free elections at approximately regular intervals since 
its independence. Unlike the armed forces in many neighboring countries, its military is 
clearly subordinate to civil power and there has never been any threat of a military 
coup.65  
 
1. The Arrival of Islam 
The background of Islamic contemporary politics in Malaysia is critical to 
understanding the present political environment. Indian and Arab traders conveyed Islam 
in the 15th century. It became the dominant religion of Aceh (Sumatra), and Malacca had 
an active and influential Muslim, though mostly Tamil Indian, minority. Although there 
had been an earlier Muslim on the throne, it was not until the 1445 coup against the 
Hindu Maharaja Sri Parameswara Dewa Shah, an exiled Hindu prince from Sumatra who 
was slain, and the succession of his Muslim half-brother, Sultan Mudzaffar Shah, that 
Islam became firmly entrenched.66 Islam was made the official religion of the state, and 
Malacca became a sultanate. To garner support, the new sultan brought some of the 
leading Malay families into the government, thereby precipitating the process of a 
peaceful conversion of the Malays to Islam. Malacca reached the zenith of its power in 
the next 60 years and became the primary center for the dissemination of Islam 
throughout the archipelago. 
One of the lower levels of politics was the control of outlying villages, which was 
vested in penghulus (headmen) of whom an idealized picture is presented in the 16th 
century Malacca Code. To carry out their functions, the penghulus had to acquaint 
themselves with the following codes: first, the Hukum Shari’ah (Islamic Law), second, 
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the Hukum Akl (principles of natural justice), third, the Hukum Faal (principles of right 
conduct), and fourth, the Hukum Adat (custom and customary law).67 Though in practice 
the order of these requirements might well be reversed, and seldom find realization in any 
one man, they signified the great importance of the penghulu in Malay village life in the 
early days.   
Malacca’s glory days came to an abrupt end in 1511 when the Portuguese 
conquered it. In the 16th century, the Portuguese vied with the Dutch for control of the 
eastern Indonesian island spice trade, and they both sought to establish this trade by 
controlling the sea-lanes. The Malacca royal family, members of the government and 
many followers fled to Johore and Brunei. Those who fled to Johore established a new 
empire at the tip of the peninsula and recruited Bugis mercenaries from Sulawesi to help 
fight its enemies. When the fighting was over, the Bugis remained, became involved in 
court rivalries, and assumed power behind the Johore throne by the 1720s. They also 
established their own sultanate in Selangor, attacked Kedah, and supported a rival sultan 
in Perak.68  
 
2. Pluralism 
British interests in the region grew by the late 18th century. Subsequently, 
Singapore, Malacca and Penang were joined administratively to form the Straits 
Settlements under the British East India Company. In the 1850s, large new deposits of tin 
ore were found in the states of Perak and Selangor. The small Malay population had little 
interest in working for wages or leaving their villages. Therefore, Chinese laborers from 
Hong Kong were recruited to work in the mines. To work the millions of acres of tropical 
forests for the production of rubber, palm oil and coffee, the British imported in 
thousands of laborers from India and China.69 This was the beginning of the development 
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of a plural ethnically divided society in Malaysia.70 The result changed the face of 
peninsular society forever.71  
The Japanese occupation between 1941-1945 touched off ethnic and religious 
conflicts. Though a faction of a Malay nationalist movement welcomed the Japanese 
occupation, other Malays joined with the British in an anti-Japanese front. The British, 
still the colonial rulers of Malaysia after the Second World War, sought to contain the 
ethnic conflict by attempting to establish a unitary state (Malayan Union), where 
feudalism would be abolished and equal citizenship granted to all. However, this attempt 
at a unitary state failed which precipitated the formation of the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) in May 1946 led by Dato Onn Jaafar, who came from an 
aristocratic Johore family. In 1948, an alternative federation scheme was proposed by the 
UMNO in lieu of the Malayan Union. It is this federation system that persists today as the 
government structure for the country.72  
The establishment of the federation system was significant as some state powers 
were restored. First, the functions of the rulers were reinstituted. Second, Malay “special 
rights” were restored. Third, strict citizenship provisions, seen as the key protection for 
the survival of the Malay race, were instituted.73 UMNO’s victory in securing the 
federation agreement solidified Malay nationalism. As a result, the UMNO has been the 
dominant political force in Malaysia from that point on until today. 
As they consolidated their power in the final years of the 19th century, the British 
not only accorded Malay rulers prerogatives in Islamic and customary matters, but also 
provided them with bureaucratic and legal machinery to implement their directives in a 
more systematic and invasive manner than ever before in Malay history.74 One reason the 
rulers chose to exercise these prerogatives so liberally was that this allowed them to fend 
off challenges to their authority, particularly from the reform-minded modernist Muslims 
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known as “kaum muda” or the young group. The young group Muslims was unimpressed 
by the idea that the interests of Islam were best served by aristocratic rulers. The young 
reformists had an only marginal effect on the Sultan’s power. However, the colonial 
linkage of state and Islam was to have a profound influence on the postcolonial evolution 
of religious pluralism in Malaysia.75 Thus, the Malay constitution of 1957 preserved and 
perpetuated the identification of Islam, the sultans, and Malay-Muslims. 
 
3. Malay Sultanate 
As the head of Islam, the sultan is the embodiment of holy divinity (rahmat). He 
is God’s representative on earth. Hence, the exalted position in Malay culture and society. 
However, it is a mistake to assume that this is the natural order of things in all Malay 
societies and at all times. 76 The modern and educated Muslims of Malaysia today have 
reverted to the kaum muda’s thoughts of the 1920s and 1930s. In fact, Professor Ungku 
Aziz, himself an aristocrat of the Johore royal family and Malaysia’s eminent economist 
and educator, feels very strongly that the institutions of the monarchy are anti-democratic 
by nature.77  
More extreme is the opinion of Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim when he says 
In an ideal Islamic state there could be no kings, no feudal lords, and no 
capitalists with a plethora of wealth. It will be a society of good middle-
class people who are the backbone of every healthy society.78  
M. Bakri Musa in his chapter on “the Sultan Syndrome” aptly describe the 
characteristics, peculiarities and behavior, or more accurately misbehavior, of the 
excessive sultans and their extended families and hangers-on of Malaysia. Not only is this 
syndrome restricted to royalties, the Malaysian elites, particularly politicians and top 
civil-servants alike, behave in such a manner that they are more concerned with elaborate 
receptions and pretentious briefings to justify their paid vacations on government expense 
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rather then executing their primary duties of solving the nation’s many unsolved 
problems.79     
The institution of monarchy by its very nature encourages a non-competitive and 
non-productive milieu. This negative influence affects all Malaysians and more so the 
Malays. Non-Malays have learned to successfully exploit royal institutions to their 
benefit. Lavish gifts, tributes, and other expensive professions of loyalty, while not 
exacting a quid pro quo, nonetheless, are appropriately reciprocated with royal favors, 
and in particular, to rich business tycoons.80 
The royals receive royal treatment and generous civil allowances for themselves, 
and their ever-expanding extended families. Their royal pedigree opens up lucrative 
business opportunities and government contracts; possibilities not readily available to 
commoners.81 This perpetuates the feelings of unfairness among the hardworking 
common Malay businessmen who have no blood links to the royal family. More so, the 
qualification of most of these sultans as guardian of Malay and the Head of Islam is 
nothing to boast about. Needless to say, the dissatisfaction among the educated 
professional middle class Malay population towards the Malay sultanate is increasing.      
 
C. ISLAM AND MALAY POLITICS 
A distinctive characteristic of Malaysian political development is the role of 
political Islam in Malay politics. It was not until the federation scheme had become a fait 
accompli, bringing with it a demonstration of UMNO-led Malay power, that Chinese and 
Indian nationalism became Malaya-centered. The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), 
formed in 1949, and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), formed in 1946, turned their 
attention toward protecting and promoting the rights of their respective ethnic 
communities.82  
The art of governing in an ethnically diverse society such as Malaysia is to ensure 
that the interests and feelings of various ethnic groups are not unduly slighted. In the 
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early years of independence, because of the salient and controversial nature of “the 
bargain” (Islam as the official religion, the special rights of the Malays and Bahasa 
Malaysia as the national language), the focus in Malaysia was mainly on the Chinese and 
to a lesser extent, the Indians.83 Sources of discontent were augmented in 1963 with the 
addition of Sabah and Sarawak, about which whose inhabitants the federal government 
knew little. There were also sources of discontent among Malays. The Pan Malaysian 
Islamic Party (PAS) represented a major center of dissent, which could outbid the UMNO 
on its greater devotion to Islam or its stronger commitment to Malay nationalism.84 The 
constitution establishing the Federation of Malaysia was not, however, enough to prevent 
further ethnic conflict. Indeed, the worst riots took place in May 1969 and led to a new 
set of policies that were to give further strength to Malay-Muslim dominance or 
bumiputra (sons of the soil). 
 
1. NEP and Formation of BN 
The New Economic Policy (NEP) was initiated in 1971 in response to the 1969 
riots. The policy was designed to be a pro-Malay affirmative action policy. Its direct 
effect was to lead to an Islamic resurgence, especially amongst the Malay Muslim Youth. 
While in its initial years the NEP concentrated on redressing socio-economic imbalances, 
today it is also concerned with issues such as identity and culture with Islam at the center.  
Beside the NEP, the Alliance (UMNO, MCA and MIC) also consolidates 
electoral support on the basis of both ethnicity and class. The Alliance concluded 
agreements with four former opposition parties: the Sarawak United People’s Party 
(SUPP), Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan, Malaysian People’s Movement - the 
governing party in Penang), the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), and Partai Islam Se-
Malaysia (PAS – Pan-Malaysia Islam Party, which ruled the state of Kelantan) to form 
the Barisan Nasional (BN – National Front). With this coalition, the remaining opposition 
party is the Chinese based Democratic Action Party (DAP). On June 1, 1974, two other 
parties, Parti Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu (PBB) in Sarawak, and the Sabah Alliance joined 
roblems surfaced and in 1977, PAS crossed over to the the BN. However, coalition p                                                 
83 Strategic Analysis Malaysia, “ Governing a Multi-ethnic, Multi-religious Malaysia,” Issue No. 5, 
2001, Bangsar, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
84 Ibid. 
33 
opposition over what PAS believed were UMNO encroachments into its political territory 
in Kelantan.85  
 
2. Socio-Economic Development 
As mentioned earlier, and in contrast to most other Muslim countries, the Islamic 
revival in Malaysia was a religio-ethnic resurgence. Many factors coalesced after post 
1969, as a result of NEP, to produce a Malay-Islamic resurgence in which religion, 
economics, language, and culture were intertwined. This is more evident among the 
younger generation of Malay students and university graduates. These students were 
uprooted from their ethnic homogeneity, integrated life, and security of predominantly 
Malay rural environments. They were thrust into modern urban cities, which were far 
more culturally diverse and experienced as they were westernized and dominated by 
Chinese “yellow culture”.86 They then turned to their Islamic heritage to preserve their 
sense of Malay-Muslim identity. 
Malay students returning from studying in the United States and Great Britain, 
who were greatly influenced by the writing and thinking of Islamic activists from the 
Arab world, Iran, and Pakistan, further reinforced Islamic revivalism in Malaysia.87 All 
these students proclaimed an Islamic alternative, a common reassertion of Islam as a total 
way of life and a God-ordained alternative to the excesses of capitalism and socialism. 
This new wave of Islamic reawakening contributed to increased government concerns 
and sensitivity to Islamic sentiments and issues. To capture these potential voters, the 
government thus embarked on the Islamization process.  
 
3. Malay-Muslim Votes 
Voting is not compulsory, and all Malaysian over the age of 21 are eligible to 
vote. Since the first federal elections in 1955, parliamentary elections have been 
conducted as constitutionally required.88 In the federal elections held between 1959 and 
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88 Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, “Malaysia”, in Ian Marsh, Jean Blondel and 
Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: East and Southeast Asia, 
1990, voter turnout ranged between 70% and 78.9%, while the turnout in state elections 
during the same period ranged between 71.7% and 78.9%.89 Parliamentary seats 
contested for elections were 52 in 1955, 104 (1959, 1964), 144 (1969), 154 (1974, 1978, 
1982), 177 (1986), 180 (1990), 192 (1995), and 193 (1999).90 By the 1990s, UMNO’s 
main bastions of support were still the peninsula’s rural Malays and Sabah’s rural 
Muslim bumiputras.91 Meanwhile, the Chinese populations are centered in urban areas. 
Given the UMNO’s vastly superior membership base and extensive party 
machinery, during elections, most BN parties depend on the UMNO to run an effective 
campaign to secure electoral support. In the 1986 and 1990 general elections, even the 
leaders of the MCA, Gerakan, and MIC acknowledged that their electoral victory was 
due primarily to the Malay support that the UNMO had managed to secure for them.92 
This reliance change in 1999. It is estimated that about 65% to 70% of Malay-Muslim 
voters turned against the UMNO and the BN in the general election held a year after the 
dismissal and detention of former deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. Similarly, 
about 60% of Chinese voted otherwise.  
Barisan Alternatif (BA- Alternative Front)93 in the 1999 election won a total of 42 
parliamentary seats, of which PAS won 27 seats, Keadilan (National Justice Party) won 
five seats, DAP won 10 seats and Parti Rakyaat Malaysia (PRM- People’s Party of 
Malaysia) a secular Malay base party, did not win any seats. The Sabah opposition party, 
Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS- United Sabah Party) that is not a component of BA won 3 
seats.  
                                                 
The United Nations University Press, Tokyo, Japan, 1999, p. 231.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Strategic Analysis Malaysia, “Islamic Politics in Malaysia: A Larger Context For Reformation,” 
Issue 4, 2001and NSTP, 23 April 1995. 
91 Ibid. Ian Marsh et al., p. 234. 
92 Ibid. Ian Marsh, et al., p. 234. 
93 A new political party was born following the political turmoil of former deputy PM Anwar 
Ibrahim’s sacking and the wave of discontent sweeping the country then. Anwar’s wife, Dr. Wan Azizah 
Wan Ismail, heads the new party, the National Justice Party or Keadilan. The emergence of the political 
alliance just before the 1999 election had evidently been based on a general acceptance of the need for a 
stronger opposition and an attempt to build a single multiracial front for the opposition forces. (Source: 
Strategic Analysis Malaysia, Issue 3, 2001). 
35 
In 1955, PAS won one out of the 52 seats in the national legislature. Its best 
performance to date was in 1999 when it won 27 seats in the Parliament and captured two 
states to lead the opposition.94 The political significance of the Islamic party lies in the 
dual facts that it has been able to open up and sustain Islamic discourses in Malaysian 
politics vis-à-vis the nationalist UMNO as well as to provide a political organization to 
dissenting Malays-Muslim, especially in the so called Malay-Muslim hinterland of 
Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis and Kedah.95 
The results of the November 1999 general election indicate that the non-Malay 
rallied behind the BN in even more spectacular fashion than in the 1995 election. 
Although wooed by the opposition BA parties to build a more democratic Malaysia, the 
majority of non-Malays were unprepared to give up the BN and its discourse of 
developmentalism.96 Constitutionally, a party needs two thirds of the parliamentary seats 
(presently 129 seats) to form a government and to have the mandate to carry out any 
amendment to the 1957 constitution. 
 
4. UMNO 
The BN coalition was launched in 1973 following the racial strife of 13 May 
1969, and is dominated by the UMNO. The UMNO had approximately 2.765 million 
members spread out among 17,355 branches in all parliamentary constituencies in the 
peninsula and Sabah.97 Rural teachers and mainly conservative Malay nationalists 
dominated the initial stages of the UMNO. However, a consequence of the NEP, which 
was replaced by the National Development Policy, NDP, in 1990 until 2020, was that 
rich businessmen entered mainstream politics in the 1980s. “Money Politics” then 
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became a new phenomenon. Political patronage had thus become the key to wealth.98 
Meanwhile, Islamic resurgence also took root when PM Dr. Mahathir managed to 
persuade Anwar Ibrahim to join the UMNO to counter the un-Islamic labeling of the 
Islamic opposition party, PAS. UMNO’s ideological stand is right of center, with strong 
neofeudal and conservative, traditionalist elements in the party’s culture.99  
UMNO’s first leaders, Dato’ Oon Jaffar, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul 
Razak and Tun Hussein Oon, were all members of the Malay aristocracy. Initially, the 
party was meant to be a nationalist organization that brought together the different 
political groupings within the Malay-Muslim community. However, in 1951, the ulama 
and religious functionaries within the party left to form their own organization, which 
later became the Malaysian Islamic party, PAS.100 The “liberal democratic era”101 of the 
first PM Tunku Abdul Rahman, came to an end after the 1969 riot. The government of 
BN lead by the UMNO defended their limited procedural democracy with three issues. 
First, public debates concerning sensitive ethnic issues should be stopped to avoid social 
unrest. Second, the standard of living of its citizens should be upgraded and third, there 
was a need to modify democratic values to historical and local environment objectives.102 
The leaders that call for a strong centralized government control, consider the interests of 
the community over individual liberty, discipline and cooperation, and uphold the values 
of obedience and thankfulness lauded new concepts such as, “Asian democracy”, and 
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5. Mahathir’s Era 
Dr. Mahathir became PM of Malaysia in 1981. He introduced some reforms and 
liberalized newspapers, media, and freed some Internal Security Act (ISA) detainees. 
However, his liberalism led Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, the then trade and industry 
minister, to challenge him for UMNO’s presidency in 1987104 and also led to the Chinese 
teacher’s crisis.105 PM Mahathir consolidated his “modified local democracy with a 
touch of authoritarian rule” by ensuring that he had a strong political base by eliminating 
his political enemies and retaining his loyal supporters. He then introduced and 
acknowledged English for international business and economic development. He 
prevented PAS from implementing hudud (Islamic criminal law) in the state of Kelantan. 
Mahathir declared that Malaysia’s laws were in conformity with Islam by using the 
concept of tawassut (moderation) and awlawiyyat (priority).106 He reaffirmed the values 
of pluralism and tolerance, and warned of religious extremism.  
At the same time, the government continued to espouse a positive, reformist 
understanding of Islam and Islamic values by portraying Islam as a dynamic religion with 
a strong work ethic to support Malaysia’s aggression approach to business and 
industrialization.107 Vision 2020 was announced with a goal to make Malaysia a modern 
and industrialized nation by the year 2020. It must be a nation that is fully developed 
along all dimensions such as economically, politically, socially, spiritually, 
psychologically, and culturally.108 
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D. THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAMIC SOCIETIES 
The Malay ethnic group has been divided politically, and therefore requires the 
support of either Chinese or Indians in order to gain political dominance.109 This 
situation leads to a central fact in the country’s political life that Malay-Muslim 
dominance has always been negotiated amongst various forces. In many Muslim 
countries, the Islamic agenda is dominated by the discourse of Islamic groups that 
demand the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of shari’ah. Within 
this worldview, there is little room for dissenting opinions, even for those of a more 
progressive reinterpretation of the Qur’an, a re-examination of the exegetical and legal 
texts of the classical scholars of Islam, and an analysis of how principles of justice, 
freedom, and equality can be applied in contemporary society.110  
Post 1969 produced the growth of Islamic dakwah (call) movements. This call to 
Islam refers not only to proselytizing among non-Muslims but also to those Muslims born 
to Islam to become more observant.111 As explained previously, the post NEP young 
generations call for the return to Islam as a total way of life by combining worship and 
social activism for a greater Islamization of Malaysia society. However, the dakwah 
groups differ in their interpretations of revivalist Islam and therefore had differing 
implications for personal and public life. 
The movements and the Islamic societies that created a strong influence and a 
push towards the Islamization process embarked on by the Malaysian government are: 
Darul Arqam (the House of Arqam), ABIM (the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia), 
SIS (Sisters-in Islam) and JUST (the International Movement for the Just World).     
 
1. Darul Arqam 
Darul Arqam is basically an Islamic movement that wishes to return to the 
original version of Islam. Founded in 1968, by Ustaz (teacher) Ashaari Muhammad, it 
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emphasized the importance of establishing an Islamic society prior to creating an Islamic 
state.112 It began as a study group among Muslim scholars and reformers comprised of 
university lecturers and academics. In time it evolved into a Sufi-inspired alternative 
lifestyle movement and apolitical in orientation that was very much centered on the 
personality of its founder. Its activities and members living in communities were based at 
Sungai Pencala, near Kuala Lumpur. The movement was concerned about policing the 
cultural and discursive frontiers of Muslim society and much attention was paid to the 
personal lives and behavior of its members. The movement encouraged its members to 
dress in authentic Islamic dress, which included Arab-style green robes, turbans and 
beards for men and a black hijab that completely covered the women.113  
The movement discourse of purity and authenticity led them to establish factories 
producing purified halal (Islamically permitted) foods, drinks, make-up, soaps, 
toothpaste and other basic goods. By the early 1990s, Darul Arqam had become a 
powerful and wealthy organization with international offices. Some 48 Darul Arqam 
communities in Malaysia have their own schools and medical clinics. In addition, they 
run educational, agricultural, manufacturing, and social service projects, as well as 
restaurants and publishing houses.114  
In 1994, the Malaysian government moved against the Darul Arqam movement 
by charging its leader, Ashaari, with engaging in radical politics, training a suicide squad 
in Thailand and conspiring to overthrow the Malaysian government in 1986. There was 
also a growing fear of the movement’s influence spreading among the middle class 
students and professionals, its penetration of the UMNO elite, and its political agenda. 
Ashaari was arrested under the ISA for teaching deviant Islamic teachings and for being 
considered a threat to national security. The Government Islamic Council (Pusat Islam) 
issued a fatwa (religious edict) condemning Arqam as a deviant sect. Ashaari and his 
followers made public confessions on national television. Darul Arqam was disbanded, 
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its properties and institutions seized, and the group’s members absorbed within the 
broader Muslim community.115                
 
2. ABIM 
The most vital, effective, and politically successful dakwah movement in the 
1970s and early 1980s was the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan Belia 
Islam Malaysia, or ABIM).116 It was formed by a number of Malay-Muslim university 
student activists from the National Association of Muslim Students on 6 August 1971. As 
it developed, the movement became centered on the charismatic leadership of one its 
founders, Anwar Ibrahim, who served its president from 1974 until his resignation in 
1982. ABIM’s Islamic orientation was modern reformist rather than a return to the Islam 
of the more traditional ulama and of PAS.117 The new generation of Malay-Muslim 
activists like Anwar Ibrahim and the leaders of ABIM were very much influenced by the 
ideas of local Malaysian Islamist scholars such as Seyyed Naguib al-Attas as well as 
foreign Muslim intellectuals and political leaders like Ab’ul Al’a Maudoodi (the founder 
of the Jama’ati Islami of Pakistan), Hassan al-Banna (founder of the Ikhwan’ul Muslimun 
of Egypt), Malek Ben Nabi of Algeria and the Islamist intellectual Ismail Raj Faruqi of 
the United States.118  
ABIM is not a political party with its mission and goals to spread Islam and 
revitalize the Muslim community in Malaysia through preaching, communications, and 
education. In other words, “Islam first, Malay second,” has been ABIM’s motto since its 
inception.119 ABIM’s leaders condemned secularism per se and other western ideologies 
that they regarded as antithetical to Islam, and called for the purification of Muslim 
culture in the interest of creating a healthy Islamic society. They denounced corruption, 
poverty, maldistribution of wealth, the penetration of decadent western pop culture, 
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gambling, and alcohol consumption and called for greater political and press freedom and 
respect for human rights.      
 
3. Sisters-in-Islam (SIS) 
In recent years, the Qur’an has become a touchstone for controversy as well as 
piety. Particularly prominent is the debate over the empowerment of Muslim women, 
who have become both combatants and prized for the struggle between western critics of 
Islam and their Muslim opponents. A recent discussion of the Qur’an from a feminist 
point of view is Amina Wadud Muhsin’s, “Qur’an and Woman” (1992). First published 
in Malaysia, it is presently used as a manifesto by the “Sisters in Islam” movement. In her 
approach to the Qur’an, the American Wadud Muhsin attempts to lay the groundwork for 
a nontraditional tafsir from a scripturally legitimate perspective. She postulates a 
distinction between the historically and actually contextualized “prior text” of the Qur’an 
and wider metatext that conveys a more tolerant and universalistic worldview. Her 
conclusion is that while the Qur’an indeed acknowledged functional gender distinctions 
based on biology, it does not propose essential or culturally universal values for males 
and females.120 
In Malaysia, SIS has played a leading role in pursuing the boundaries of women’s 
rights within Islam and within the framework of a country that is fast modernizing and 
relatively democratic, as well as endowed with a federal constitution that respects the 
fundamental liberties and the equality of people before the law.121 According to Zainah 
Anwar 
They were convinced that it is not Islam that oppresses women, but 
interpretations of the Qur’an influenced by natural practices and values of 
a patriarchal society. Besides, for much of Islamic history, it is men who 
have interpreted the Qur’an and the traditions for Muslims.122  
SIS was set up as a working group of Muslim feminist intellectual activists in 
1988 and was officially registered in 1993, with a mission, “to promote the development 
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of Islam in Malaysia that upholds the principles of equality, justice and democracy,” 
which also takes on broader gender-related concerns and questions that relate specifically 
to Muslim women.123 Through their publications, letter-writing campaigns, awareness 
generating forums and other activities, SIS has managed to raise the level of awareness 
over issues related to Islam and Muslim women’s right in the country and beyond.124  
 
4. JUST 
Created in Penang in September 1992, the International Movement for Just World 
(JUST) is a fully-fledged non-governmental organization (NGO) with international links 
and chapters created on 15 May 1997. As Dr. Farish mentioned, “JUST is a human rights 
NGO with a difference: working within the context of a largely religious and 
conservative society like Malaysia, the organization’s founders feel the need to develop a 
discourse of human rights and fundamental liberties that would operate with and within 
the discourse of religion as well.”125 In addition, the organization has also been doing 
something that few other Islamist organizations have been able to do successfully. It has 
sought to promote inter-cultural and inter-civilization dialogue between Muslims and 
non-Muslims and tried to encourage a better understanding of non-Muslim religions, 
cultures and civilizations among Muslims as well.126     
 
E. GOVERNMENT AND ISLAMIC RESURGENCE 
The identification of “caliph” with humanity as a whole, rather than with a single 
ruler or political institution, is affirmed in the “Universal Islamic Declaration of Human 
Rights”, a document drawn up by the “Islamic Council of Europe”.127 In this framework, 
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the firsts phase of the “fulfillment of social-political khilafah” is “the creation of the 
community of believers,” while the second phase “is to reach the level of self-
governance.” This perception of “caliph” becomes a foundation for concepts of human 
responsibility and of opposition to systems of domination in Muslim nations and their 
governing styles. 
Until the late 1970s, the policy lines between the UMNO and PAS had been quite 
clearly indicated. Both held opposing views on Islamic law and the Islamic state. The 
UMNO looked on itself as the party of the Malays who were Muslims. Consequently, it 
was an upholder of Islam and Islamic values without being perceived as militant. Beyond 
the purely religious perspective, the UMNO did not see Islam as a source of trouble or an 
extravagance of economic development policies.128 PAS’ religious stance was more 
forthright than that of the UMNO. Since its inception in 1951, it had supported the idea of 
an Islamic state. Despite its rhetoric, which could sometimes be construed or perceived as 
revolutionary, the fact remains that it has thus far chosen to be committed to the system 
of parliamentary democracy by participating in general elections and by-elections.129 In 
1955, the party won one out of the 52 seats in the national legislature. Its best 
performance to date was in 1999, when it won 27 out of 193 seats and PAS managed to 
retain Kelantan and wrest the state of Terengganu from BN. 
During the Islamic resurgence in the mid-1970s, a new generation of Muslim 
political activists such as Anwar Ibrahim and Fadzil Noor emerged and crystallized a 
socio-political movement of Islamic modernism in the organizational form of ABIM as 
described earlier. It attracted the widespread support of, and catered to, socio-education 
and spiritual/psychological needs of the younger, more educated, urban and modern 
Muslims, particularly tertiary students, who seemed to be facing a Malay/Muslim identity 
crisis as a result of modernization, as well as changes in socio-economic structures and 
roles.130  
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The political choice of those Islamic modernists differed. While Anwar Ibrahim, a 
former detainee under the Internal Security Act (ISA), chose to join the UMNO in 1982 
with the declared intention of reforming the ruling party from within, Fadzil Noor opted 
to join arch rival PAS instead. Although both men joined different political parties, their 
agenda seemed to be the same, which was to endeavor to transform the UMNO and PAS 
from their originally Malay nationalist base into a more Islamic modernist movement. 
With the emergence of the Malay/Muslim based multiethnic National Justice Party, a 
third factor entered into Islamic politics and political discourses in Malaysia.131   
 
1. Racial Tolerance 
Despite the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia, racial tolerance and accommodation 
is still intact. Quoting Bakri’s argument 
To many successful non-Malays, the special privileges accorded to 
Bumiputras evoke not resentment but resigned acceptance. This 
acceptance is greatly facilitated by a steadily growing economy. They 
recognize the essential difference between preferential treatment and 
active discrimination. Although the government favors Bumiputras, non-
Malays are at liberty to pursue their own social and economic interests. 
They are free to fund their own schools, hospitals, and foundations.132  
Malaysian also realized that ethnic hatred once aroused is extremely difficult to 
stifle. The trauma of 1969 still remains. Just as with the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and 
the genocide in Rwanda, it will take generations to heal.     
 
2. Predominant Race133 
There is in reality no non-Malay dilemma. Non-Malays have accepted the 
legitimacy of the Malay language and ethos in Malaysia much as Japanese-Americans 
have accepted English cultural and language dominance. The continuing struggle in many 
plural societies is over establishing the alpha status of a culture or group. 
Plural America is socially stable because immigrants have accepted the alpha 
status of Anglo-Saxons. German and French immigrants who are proud of their own rich 
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and established traditions readily accept Anglo-Saxon dominance. Their names may be 
Shmidt and St. Pierre but they willingly learn to speak English, as do their children, and 
they love roast beef over frankfurters and fondue. Americans are proud of their melting 
pot model. They rightly point out their many interesting ingredients but there is no 
mistaking that the end product is essentially an American (or English) stew despite the 
Mexican spice, Italian wine, and French cheese. 
Malaysia has eschewed the American melting pot in favor of its own “Salad 
Bowl” model. The lettuce being Malays. No lettuce, no salad. There may be onions and 
black olives to enhance the taste. Too strong an onion or too many black olives and the 
overall flavor are spoiled. Non-Malays, while accepting the predominant status of 
Malays, have maintained their ethnic heritage within the larger Malaysian context. 
Various cultural celebrations are still dominant, celebrated and enjoyed by all. With the 
world filled with the horror of ethnic violence in previously seemingly peaceful societies, 
Malaysians are fully aware of the consequences of not having the stability and harmony 
they presently enjoy. 
 
3. Intra Communal Conflict 
M. Bakri wrote that 
The present state of racial tolerance in Malaysia is real and represents a 
fundamental change and maturation in the attitude of Malaysians. They 
value peace and racial accommodation. They have seen all too frequently 
the tragic consequences of communal strife elsewhere. The inter-
communal clash in Malaysia as perceived by many is in actual fact very 
low in the measuring scale. High on the scale is a potential intra-
communal conflict. There are three potential fault lines along which 
Malays could fracture – religious, ideological, and socio-economic.134  
Malays have seen far too many splits along religious lines. The all consuming, 
totally unproductive, and tragically divisive kafir-mengafirkan (lit. infidels versus would-
be-infidels) debate of 1987 clearly illustrates the potentially explosive nature of religious 
disagreements. Political leaders debase themselves in such silly pursuits of proving who 
among them are more pure or Islamic. In parts of Malaysia, there are separate mosques 
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for the PAS followers and the other, presumably less pure, Muslims. There have even 
been instances of funerals and marriages boycotted because of political differences. 
The 1985 Memali uprising in Kedah, PM Dr. Mahathir’s home state claimed 18 
lives and scores of injuries. It was the most violence disturbance since the 1969 riot. To 
the outside world, it was simply reported as an uprising of peasants over some land 
issues. It was, in fact, a mini civil war involving supporters of PAS and those of the 
central government (UMNO) between true believers and presumed pretenders.  
Ideologically135, there had been fights between royalists and republicans. In the 
1980’s constitutional crisis involving the sultans and executives branch, sudden 
intolerance of royal excesses were exposed extensively by the media. The depth and 
intensity between pro and anti-royal elements resulted in many split families and villages. 
The frightening aspect of that crisis was how quickly it degenerated, and threatened the 
very stability of the country. That feud was not the first to involve sultans. In 1948, the 
sultans opposed the appointment of a Malay civil servant to be Deputy High 
Commissioner, which is an administrative position within the colonial civil service. The 
sultans would not tolerate a commoner, the proposed candidate, to be their constitutional 
superior. Many other minor skirmishes involving the palaces were either downplayed or 
blacked out from the media but the republicans were keeping notes. Royal excesses have 
a long tradition in Malaysia and an opportunity for another “royal clash” exists which 
will probably is a more bloody and ugly scenario.  
The social unrest involving “reformasi” may, in fact, be symptomatic of a social 
split along economic lines. Income disparity is greatest among Malays and getting worse. 
The average and poor Malays are frustrated because they have worked hard to improve 
their living standard and obtain a better income. Whereas a few hand picked individuals, 
politically connected, and the close relatives of elites, were instantly made millionaires, 
they did not do this through their own sweat or ingenuity but through the largesse of NEP 
and NDP. The black list, or the recipients of the government‘s many lucrative contracts 
and privatization projects, exposed by the PM during the UMNO General Assembly in 
                                                 
135 M. Bakri Musa elaborates extensively including ideological differences between socialist and 
conservatives but the scenario was of least important in my opinion. p. 271. 
47 
1998, revealed the extensive inefficiency and “crony capitalism”136 that disgusted the 
hardworking average Malays. The “economically just society” envisioned by the PM is, 
alas, widening the economic disparities within the Malay community itself. It has, 
however, been successful in alleviating some of the gross inequities between the races.        
 
F. CONCLUSION 
As M. Bakri pointed out, communal harmony is greatly enhanced when there are 
no gaping socio-economic and educational disparities between the various groups. The 
Islamic establishment must not, through its zeal and preoccupation for life in the world 
hereafter, lead its followers into economic decline. Muslims still have their present life to 
live, and live it productively. The best tribute to Islam is not for Malaysia to build ornate 
and grandiose mosques or to endlessly proclaim its lofty status as a state religion. Malays 
would best symbolize the glory of Islam by assuming their rightful place in the modern 
world. When Muslims once again contribute their share of inventive scientists, creative 
artists, and resourceful entrepreneurs, then they are indeed following His command.137  
I certainly do agree with M. Bakri’s comments that 
There is nothing wrong with the old traditional Malay that new and 
enlightened leadership would not right. Frankly, Malays are battle-
fatigued with calls for revolusi mental (mental revolution), Melayu Baru 
(new Malay), berdikari (self reliant) and the latest, reformasi 
(reformation). 
Certainly, it is, “they (leaders, elites, and sultans inclusive) that have to acquire 
new ways of thinking and a new system of values and adjust their new thinking to the 
new realities as suggested by PM Dr. Mahathir.”138 The loss of Terengganu in the 1999 
election I believe is not so much due to the resurgence of Islamic groups but to a voice of 
dissidence towards UMNO’s elites and political leaders concerning their behavior and the 
“sultan’s syndrome”. The “culture of greed” that the PM had voiced during the UMNO’s 
general assembly in 1993 came to fruition in the last election. Probably, the PM also 
unknowingly played his role in disseminating the wealth of the country to the privileged 
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few. Decentralized contracts and projects to the lowest bureaucratic organization could be 
an alternative option to win the Malay-Muslim votes again. In other words, spread the 
wealth as low as possible rather than concentrating in on a privileged few. The progress 
and success of Islam is based on its ummah and not on any one individual.     
On the Malay sultanate, M. Bakri further argues that, PM Dr. Mahathir’s assertion 
that, “Malays are feudalist and wish to remain so without the rulers would mean the 
complete eclipse of the Malays,” has no credence. Among modern Malays, especially 
those in the professional and private sector, the monarchy is irrelevant. It is persuasively 
argued that the monarchy is a hindrance to Malay society by impeding its progress. If all 
the resources allocated to royal institutions, such as luxurious palaces, tax-free status, 
elaborate ceremonies and investitures, were instead given to bright Malay students and 
rural schools, Malays would advance much faster.139 Definitely this is so true when 
compared to American simple ceremonies and I just could not imagine how much 
savings and benefits would be distributed to the much-needed rural schools or amenities 
of the kampongs (village) folks if these excesses and ceremonies are minimized or totally 
eliminated.  
At the political level, the battle for the hearts and minds of the Malay Muslims 
electorate has pitched the UMNO, the dominant Malay Muslim party of the ruling 
National Front government, and PAS, the Islamic party, in what many of us see as a 
“holier-than-thou” battle for the Malay vote.140 In reality, this has been the case since 
1982, when PAS was taken over by religious “young Turks,” educated in Islamic 
theology, jurisprudence, and philosophy at Arab universities, and in particular, at Al-
Azhar, in Cairo. With Keadilan as the third force, the political struggle to woo the Malay-
Muslim population will continue in the future. With an even split between the three 
parties, the future political winner will be the votes of non-Malay as the final arbiter.  
At the height of the public debate between PAS and its opposition ally, the DAP, 
on the Islamic State issue, the National Justice Party reiterated its rejection of an Islamic 
state but reaffirmed Islam as a way of life (ad deen) for Muslims.141 PRM also shares the 
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position of the National Justice Party. Following the rejection of the concept of the ‘Islam 
State’ by three out of four of the component parties of the Alternative Front, it seems that 
PAS is isolated in its ultimate objective. 
A point to note, as in the electoral arrangement of the Alternative Front in the 
1999 general election, PAS was allocated 64 parliamentary seats to contest and won only 
27 seats. In order to amend the Federal Constitution, PAS or any other party needs at 
least 129 seats or a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Even the least probability of 
UMNO cooperating with PAS and National Justice Party to change the Federal 
Constitution to set up an “Islamic State” is impossible and not justified. The total number 
of parliamentary seats held by UMNO (72), PAS (27) and the National Justice Party (5) 
is only 104 or 25 seats short of the required number.             
With regards to all the NGO’s movement and society, and other social interest 
groups as Shamsul A. B. pointed out 
It is civic organizations, above all, that have contributed most to the 
reflowering of pluralism. This shift in political culture in contemporary 
politics involves a shift away from the colonially generated categories of 
race, ethnicity, and religion to something he termed, heuristically, an 
interest-based politics, largely non-communal and non-ethnic in nature.142  
While the Malaysian government does not tolerate Islamic deviationist sects such 
as Darul Arqam or any future extremist organizations, NGOs such as SIS and JUST do 
have some influence and recognition. SIS, a local organization with strong international 
support and linkages, has played a very visible role in reorienting the direction of debates 
(the domain of ulamas) over issues related to gender, sexuality, human rights and inter-
personal relations in the country. Meanwhile JUST ambitiously attempts to develop a 
deeper understanding of the struggle for social justice and human rights at the global 
level, which it believes, should be guided by universal spiritual and moral values rooted 
in the oneness of God.143            
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Historically, Malaysia has managed to build a pluralistic state and managed to 
embark on its moderate Islamization process while sustaining Malay-Muslim privileges. 
The pluralism of Malaysian society has been a society of compromise, accommodation, 
and tolerance. Economic stability among the minority non-Malay is the factor that has 
managed to subdue communal tension and conflict. Meanwhile, the NEP has not only 
wrought major economic and social changes in Malaysia, despite its flaw of uneven 
wealth distribution, but it also redefined its politics. Islam in Malaysia is more visible 
today than ever before and it is a modern, “consuming Islam” as evidenced by the 
proliferation of Muslim financial institutions, medical centers, and social work 
organizations as well as tourist agencies and supermarkets.144 Moderate Islam has been, 
is, and will continue to be uncontested in Malaysia.       
                                                 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
52 
IV. THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN INDONESIA 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In Aceh, a very troubled place, there is an extraordinary development related to 
Islam and democracy. Many of us are aware that large groups in Aceh are waging a 
separatist movement against Indonesia, and there is a lot of violence. Yet, however, the 
leading peace campaign is conducted by a Muhammadiyah Youth Organization (Pemuda 
Muhammadiyah Aceh) with a series of campaigns and publications that shock most 
Americans because they proclaim, “Islam loves peace,” “Islam hates violence,” and 
“Islam supports human rights.”145 Hundreds of thousands of these pamphlets are 
produced and put into the hands of almost every person in Aceh who attends Friday 
religious services at the mosque. This effort is executed by a mass-based Muslim 
organization in Aceh, and this program is supported by the Asia Foundation based in San 
Francisco and Washington DC.146   
To the average Western mind, Indonesia is perhaps synonymous with its ancient 
Hindu-Buddhist temples with the wonders of Barabudhur and the graceful Balinese 
dance, arts and the abundance of various cultures in the “approximately 17,000 islands in 
the archipelago”.147 With 210 million people, it is the fourth largest population in the 
world with 300 ethnic groups and the world’s largest Muslim community with almost 
90% of the populace being Muslim.148 
Interestingly Anderson noted, “A seventy-year old Indonesian man or woman 
today will have observed and/or directly experienced the following”: 
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• As a primary school age child – the police-state authoritarianism of the 
last calm days of Dutch colonial rule and the abrupt collapse of this 
regime in March 1942 at the hands of Hirohito’s armies 
• As a young teenager – the wartime Japanese military regime of public 
executions, mass starvation and forced labor 
• On the eve of adulthood – four years (1945-49) of popular struggle for 
national liberation against the re-imposition of Dutch rule. This was a time 
of violent social revolution against aristocrats and colonial collaborators, 
local pogroms against people of Chinese descent, anti-colonial warfare 
carried on by a semi-regular Republican army trained by the Japanese, as 
well as dozens of private militias, armed gangs and supporters of an 
Islamic state. 
• As a young adult – in a time of a fragile liberal Democracy (1950-57), 
armed rebellions of different types in the Moluccas, Aceh, South 
Sulawesi, and in the West and parts of Central Java 
• As a young father or mother – the CIA instigated and supplied civil war of 
1958-60, and the spreading social violence of President Sukarno’s 
“Guided Democracy”, culminating in the cataclysm of 1965-66, when at 
least 600,000 and perhaps as many as two million people regarded as 
affiliated with the Indonesian communist party were slaughtered by the 
military under Suharto’s leadership, in alliance with gangs of Muslims, 
Protestant, Catholic, and Hindu-Balinese youth groups 
• In middle age – the New Order police-state, and its bloody attempt to 
annex East Timor, which cost over 200,000 East Timorese lives, as well as 
those yet uncounted numbers of Indonesian soldiers 
• In old age – the spread of armed resistance to the state in Aceh, and West 
Papua, the savage riots of May 1998, which involved more than a 
thousand deaths and brought about Suharto’s fall from power. The 
outbreak of inter-confessional warfare in the longtime peaceful 
Moluccas.149 
Allow me to continue with: 
• In the new century – a quick succession of three presidents, Habibie 
(1998-99), Wahid (1999-2001), and Megawati (2001-??). East Timor’s 
independence, financial scandals that resulted in the impeachment and the 
removal of Wahid from office, outbreaks of new ethnic violence in 
Kalimantan and the first lady president from the secular-nationalist group.  
 
During this high profile drama, Islamic parties played a crucial role during 
Wahid’s election, his impeachment, and backing of Megawati for president. With such 
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upheavals and turbulent background, the present government’s main concern is, “about 
constitutional reform that will bring about real democratic change while at the same time 
ensuring that Indonesia does not return to the volatile multi-party chaos of the 1950s.”150 
Following the above episodes, this chapter will examine initially the politics of 
Islam and ideology in 1945 in the Muslim majority nation of Indonesia that shaped the 
country into what it is presently. It will be followed by the role of the Islamic societies, 
and in particular, the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, influences on the 
population, and politics in the Old and the New Order regime. Then, the role of Islam in 
the Armed Forces of Indonesia in the past and in the future of Indonesian politics will be 
elaborated upon and will conclude by discussing the Islamic political discourse faced by 
Muslims in Indonesia during the transitions to democracy.  
 
B. POLITICAL ISLAM AND IDEOLOGY IN 1945 
 
1. Javanese Islamic History 
The arrival of Islam in Indonesia goes back nearly seven hundred years ago. Arab 
and Indian traders brought their faith with them along with the goods they bartered for 
the spices of the East Indies.151 From its initial landing in Sumatra, Islam’s influence 
gradually spread down through Java and the manner in which the Islamization process 
spread to all areas of Indonesia signifies the beginning of many processes of change. As 
noted by Ricklefs, “there is no evidence of foreign military expeditions imposing Islam 
by conquest”.152   
From the beginning, Islam did not displace or destroy existing cultural traditions, 
mainly Hindu and Buddhist, but produced a synchronized variation that is remarkably 
tolerant, pluralistic and non-coercive. Moreover, the proselytizing traders arriving on 
Indonesian shores were mostly steeped in the more accommodating Sufi school of Islam, 
                                                 
150 Andrew MacIntyre, “Indonesia,” in Ian Marsh, Jean Blondel and Takashi Inoguchi, eds.,, 
Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: East and Southeast Asia United Nations University 
Press, Tokyo, Japan, 1999, pp. 261-281. 
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rather than the orthodox Arab varieties.153 By the end of 18th century, the winds of 
Islamic reform had reached Indonesia from the Middle East. The Malays of the 
archipelago were exposed to new schools of thought in the Muslim world ranging from 
Wahabism to Islamic reformism and modernization, which led to tension within the 
community as manifested by the Padri wars of the early 19th century.154  
 
2. Javanese Schism 
The arrival of reform or modernist Islam widened the already apparent divisions 
within Indonesia’s Muslim community. Adam Schwarz, quoting from the American 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s study, “The Religion of Java”, identified three broad 
types of belief among Java’s Muslims: abangan, santri and priyayi.155 The distinctions 
outlined by Geertz can be useful in a historical sense for understanding the forces that are 
currently at work in modern Indonesian Islam.  
For the abangan Indonesian,156 religion is a mixture of traditional mystical 
beliefs, Hindu-Buddhism and Islam. Avowedly tolerant and syncretic, abangan or 
nominal, Islam remains close to its Javanese roots. This sub-group is too indigenous and 
is understood as being influenced by pre-Islamic Javanese animism, though modern 
scholars have suggested that it is in practice more a derivation of Islamic Sufism and 
Indo-Persian Islamic precedents. 
For santris,157 Islam occupies a much more central place in their worldview. 
Santris are more concerned with Islamic doctrine, especially the moral and social 
interpretations of it. The santri outlook tends to be marked by a strong emphasis on the 
                                                 
153 Ibid. Adam Schwarz, p. 166. 
154 The Padri Wars in Sumatra were fought between 1828-1838. The ulama-inspired Padri movement 
was led by a number of local Hajis who had returned from Mecca and who wanted to introduce Wahabi-
inspired reforms on the practices of the local Muslims. They declared a jihad against the political elite and 
the matrilineal customs of the Kingdom of Minangkabau, which they argued was un-Islamic. The Dutch 
colonial authorities finally intervened, taking sides with the Minangkabau royal family and its forces. 
However, by the end the conflict, the Minangs were overwhelmed and the Padris executed the 
Minangkabau royal family. The Dutch finally defeated the Padris in 1838. (Source: Dr. Farish A. Noor: 
The Globalization of Islamic Discourse and its Impact in Malaysia and Beyond, Institut fur 
Islamwissenschaft, Freie Universitat of Berlin, 20 November 2000).  
155 Ibid. Adam Schwarz, pp. 166-167. 
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necessity for unreserved belief and faith in the absolute truth of Islam and by marked 
intolerance for Javanese beliefs and practices they think are heterodox. Santris see 
themselves as “purer” Muslim than abangans. 
The priyayi158 were Java’s aristocratic elite. Originally clustered around the 
courts of the ancient Javanese kingdoms, the priyayi later formed the nucleus of the 
colonial bureaucracy. While the educated priyayi look down on the animistic features of 
abangan beliefs, their worldviews were traditionally considered to be closer to the 
abangan than to the santri. 
In colonial times, however, the main difference between the priyayi on the one 
hand and santris and abangans on the other was more clearly seen in class than in 
religious terms. The priyayi were bureaucrats and administrators, and the santris and 
abangans were petty traders, merchants and peasants.159 
 
3. Javanese Politics 
Politically, those who belonged to the abangan were more likely to be supporters 
of the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI160, while the santri, sometimes referred to 
by the abangan as ‘pseudo-Arabs’, were more likely to support one of the two leading 
Islamic parties of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP or United Development Party) or 
the nominally apolitical Nahdlatul Ulama (NU or Awakening of Religious Scholars).161 
President Sukarno in the Old Order and President Suharto with his New Order were both 
labeled as abangans with deep Javanese roots. 
The portrayal of santri and abangan religious orientations reflected the polarized 
nature of Indonesian society during the Old Order that took organizational shape prior to 
independence. Two important Muslim groupings were formed in 1912, the 
Muhammadiyah, followers of the Prophet Muhammad, founded by modernist santris 
from urban areas, and the Sarekat Islam, Islamic Association, founded by men of similar 
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160 Java’s abangan formed the basis of the PKI, as well as the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). 
161 Damien Kingsbury, “The Politics of Indonesia,” Oxford University Press Australia, 1998, pp. 12-
13. 
57 
religious temperament, which saw its mission in more economic and political terms. In 
1926, the more conservatives’ santris responded to the Muhammadiyah by founding a 
mass organization of their own: the Nahdlatul Ulama. 
 
4. Islam During the Old Order 
In the years preceding independence, the thread of nationalism, Dutch repression 
and the Javanese distaste of open conflict kept the intra-santri debate and the santri-
abangan differences from becoming uncontrollably divisive.162 After the Japanese 
expelled the Dutch in the early 1940s, the Japanese military actively courted Islamic 
groups and assiduously exploited Muslim anti-Dutch feelings.  
In 1943, the Japanese showed more of the hesitation of the Dutch about drawing 
Muslims into state administration. They established a Department of Religious Affairs; 
supported the creation of a unified Muslim political federation, known as Masyumi, and 
eventually as the threat of Allied invasion loomed large, trained Muslim militias.163 Brief 
as it was, the period of Japanese occupation from March 1942 to August 1945 had 
decisive long-term consequences for Indonesia. It gave Indonesians their first taste of a 
militarized state with a militaristic ideology by which they became, also for the first time, 
“Asians”.164  
During the first years of independence declared by Sukarno and Mohammad 
Hatta on August 17, 1945 the focus of heated political controversy that pre-occupied 
Indonesian organizations had been the role of Islam in shaping civil society and the 
nation’s political institutions. Politically active Muslims that had hoped for a formal 
linkage of Islam and state to be stipulated in the state’s constitution were disappointed at 
its exclusion in favor of the “five principles” of Pancasila. While concession to the first 
principle to read “belief in a singular god” was made, the Pancasila does not codify the 
implementation of shariah (Islamic law).165 The statement, “Belief in One God with the 
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obligation for adherents of Islam to implement the Islamic law (shariah),” known as the 
“Jakarta Charter” remains a political clarion call and will foster resentment of the 
Islamic community for years to come.166 
Over the next six years, Muslim influences in national politics steadily declined. 
In light of the memory of the Madiun affair167, Sukarno’s ban on Masyumi, the PKI’s 
attacks on the HMI (Association of Islamic Students), and PII (Indonesian Muslim 
Pupils), the collapse of santri businesses, and the efforts of some Javanese to repudiate 
Islam outright, Muslim leaders felt pushed to the limit.168 In the Javanese countryside the 
most important partners in the anti-communist network were Nahdlatul Ulama, members 
of the now-banned Masyumi, and modernist youth organizations such as the HMI and 
PII, conservative nationalists and the armed forces.169 
 
5. Islam During the New Order 
The watershed event of Indonesian political history is the coup attempt of 
September 30/October 1, 1965 which implicated the communist party in an effort to 
overthrow the government.170 President Sukarno was stripped of his powers, political 
parties were marginalized, the once powerful communist left was destroyed, and a 
military coalition headed by Lieutenant General Suharto was in power with the “New 
Order” by 1967.171  
                                                 
166 Ibid. Adam Schwarz, pp. 10-11. 
167 Ibid. As narrated by Hefner, pp. 49-51, “The Madiun affair started in mid-September 1948, where 
violent clashes between pro-PKI and pro-government forces around Jogyakarta and Surakarta in Central 
Java. After being driven out of Surakarta, PKI forces amassed in the East Javanese city of Madiun. As they 
took control of the city, PKI militias began to kill anti-communist officials. Musso, Stalinist leader of the 
PKI, announced a new government of national revolution. Violence intensified. As pro-government forces 
marched on Madiun, communist rebels began slaughtering officials linked to Masyumi and the Nationalist 
Party. In the countryside, abangan supporters of the communist, alarmed by reports that their own leaders 
were being killed, began to kill their santri neighbors. When Madiun finally fell to pro-government forces, 
angry santri in nearby Surakarta took vengeance on local abangan, executing suspected rebel sympathizers. 
Despite its limited scale, the Madiun rebellion had a lasting impact on Indonesian politics.”     
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Despite Islam’s central role in the defeat of communist forces during 1965-1966, 
as a political force, it was sidelined during the first twenty years of Suharto’s New Order. 
It was argued that a society based on religions, ethnic, regional, and class affiliations 
would not be capable of moving forward as an economically strong nation. Political 
Islam was accused of being sectarian in nature and therefore anti-Pancasila.    
As mentioned in Robert W. Hefner, four different groups were involved in the 
struggle to shape the New Order religious policy during the earliest years. The four are 
the “secular-modernizers”, moderate social democrats that were heir to the mantle of the 
Indonesian Socialist Party, the loosely organized array of Javanese mystical groups 
known as aliran kepercayaan (streams of belief) and the party of Muslim traditionalists, 
Nahdlatul Ulama.172 The last group is the believers in the compatibility of Islam and 
modern civilization, modernist Muslims.  
Hefner critically pointed out two issues that stand out in the early New Order, 
arising from these four grouping’s complex evolution of religious polities. First, some in 
the regime’s inner circle had strong Javanese or secularist convictions. Thus, religious 
interests ranked low on the hierarchy of values with which Suharto was concerned. His 
basic preoccupation was to hold power, stabilize the economy, and reap the benefits of 
development for himself and his family. In fact, the president did not hesitate to play one 
religious group against another in a manner that left a bitter uncivil legacy in Indonesian 
society. In 1984, the government escalated its ideological campaign requiring all social 
and political organization to acknowledge the Pancasila as their “sole foundation” or 
“asas tunggal”.173  Suharto’s religious policies were inconsistent because they responded 
not to the cultural logic of Javaism but to the insistent demands of unchecked power.174  
Secondly, determined in its early years to prevent any revival of organized 
Muslim politics, the regime’s policies had the unintended effect of bringing about just 
such a revival. Intent in the 1980s on creating a pliant conservative Islam, the regime 
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stimulated the growth of pro-democracy Islam. His professed interest in depoliticizing 
Islam created an “ideology of tolerance”.175  
Theologically, some found this endorsement a very difficult step to take as it 
involved subordinating the Qur’an to a man-made ideological construction in Pancasila. 
For the Muslim, submission to God involves every aspect of life both now and in the 
hereafter, therefore an endorsement of Pancasila was viewed by many as the equivalent 
step to accepting another religion. As expressly forbidden by Allah in the Qur’an in Sura 
3:85:  “If anyone desires a religion other than Islam, never will it be accepted of him; and 
in the hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost”.176  
Despite this, many Muslims were able to theologically justify such an 
endorsement. The principle used to achieve such a justification is fundamental to neo-
modernist Islamic thought in Indonesia or that of a contextualized ijtihad. This builds on 
the approach of previous modernists in that it allows for the expression of progressive 
liberal thoughts within the context of strong religious faith.  
Neo-modernist initiatives of the 1970s produced yet another group of Muslim 
woman activists who in August 1993 established the Rifka Annisa Women’s Crisis 
Center. These women challenged the established tradition and worked to promote 
women’s rights, not only in their own organization, but also with the Muhammadiyah-
linked Aisyiah. In a real sense, Rifka Annisa is a meeting point for Muslim women 
activists from both Muhammadiyah’s modernist and Nahdlatul Ulama’s neo-traditionalist 
camps.177  With the sub-activist groups within these civil-organization and contrary to 
most Muslim societies, they represent a potentially powerful political force with a vision 
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C. NAHDLATUL ULAMA AND MUHAMMADIYAH 
As Dr. Farish mentioned, the emergence of Malay-Muslim political organizations 
and religious associations such as the Sarekat Dagang Islam which was formed by Haji 
Omar Said Tjokroaminoto in 1911178, the Muhammadiyah, which was formed by Kyai 
Haji Ahmad Dahlan in 1912179, and the Nahdlatul Ulama which was formed by Kyai 
Haji Asyari in 1926, in Indonesia were very much part and parcel of a process of socio-
cultural and political development that was spurred on by changes in the wider geo-
political arena. Islamic groups emerged around the globe as sources of new initiatives for 
political change and development. As further emphasized by Esposito and Voll 
These movements represent the emergence of a major credible political 
and social alternative or circulation. The movements reflect the dual 
aspiration of modern-educated professionals in Muslim societies, who 
want greater participation in the political processes, and also want their 
societies to be more explicitly identifiable as Islamic. As a result, the new 
organizations bring together the two great trends of the late 20th century: 
religious resurgence and democratization.180  
In Indonesia, there are a few such organizations, but the most significant and 
influential are Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah.       
 
                                                 
178 Haji Omar Said Tjokrosminoto and Haji Agoes Salim formed Sarekat Dagang Islam in 1911 as an 
offshoot of Islamic activism among Muslims in Java and Sumatra. It was intended to serve as a cooperative 
venture that would work to help organize and mobilize Indonesian Muslims and help them in the process of 
economic development. It emerged as a powerful force after the economic boycott against the powerful 
Indonesian Chinese trading community and the anti-Chinese riots in Surabaya. Its main aim, however, was 
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first. In time, the Sarekat was infiltrated by many reformers and leftists and a Sarekat Islam ‘Merah’ (red) 
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primary goal was founded in 1912 under the leadership of Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan. It sought to 
modernize the standard of Islamic education given to Indonesian Muslims. It formed a woman’s section 
under the name of Aisiyah. The Muhammadiyah’s followers were keen to develop modern and progressive 
outlooks towards Islam, which would help Muslims cope with the challenges of living under modern 
colonial rule. They oppose the synergetic as well as the dogmatic trends that had developed within 
Indonesian Islam and hoped to renew the spirit of Islam by encouraging the return to the fundamental 
principles of Islam found in the Qur’an and Hadith. (Source: Ibid, Dr. Farish A. Noor, Article, 20 
November 2000).      
180 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, “Islam and Democracy,” Oxford University Press, New York, 
1996, p. 6.  
62 
1. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)181 
The Muslim organizations of NU and Indonesia make an important contribution 
to our understanding of the relationship between politics and religion, as it represents a 
significant deviation from the norms of a state-Islam interaction in most of the Muslim 
world.  As related by Ulil Abshar-Abdalla 
In 1995, Nahdlatul Ulama assigned him in charge of training for Muslim 
leaders in villages. The interesting thing he found out about these trainings 
is that, in spite of some controversy, the Muslim leaders in these villages 
mostly accepts the modern ideas of human rights, democracy, and even 
gender equality. But because new ideas are not readily accepted without 
any reference to the classical teachings of Islam, any attempt to reconcile 
democracy and Islam must be accompanied be referencing the classical 
text. The training thus encourages Muslim leaders to participate in the 
reinterpretation of classical teachings in a manner that considers concepts 
of democracy and human rights. And he reiterate that it is this kind of 
Islam, an Islam that is ready to confront the new challenges of democracy 
and human rights, is the mainstream Islam of Indonesia.182 
As highlighted by Robin Bush, “Nahdlatul Ulama” (NU) the 35 million-strong 
“traditionalist” Muslim organization, had successfully developed and propagated a 
thriving discourse of “civil-society”, and with revered NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid, 
the Indonesian president from October 1999-August 2001, it seemed likely that a 
moderate, religiously tolerant expression of Islam would play an active role in the 
continuing democratization of Indonesia.”183 It is in this civic-society also that Hefner 
                                                 
181 The Nahdlatul Ulama (Renaissance of the Ulama) movement was started in Surabaya in 1926 by 
the conservative traditionalist ulama, Kyai Haji Asyari. From the beginning, the NU was seen as a 
traditionalist movement, which gained most of its initial support from the rural elite and communities in 
central and eastern Java. A conservative grouping, the NU’s main source of membership and support came 
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1990s.       
182 Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Perspective from Indonesia,” Asian Perspective series on, “Democratic 
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183 Robin Bush, “Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia: The Case of Nahdlatul Ulama,” A paper 
presented at a conference, Consolidating Indonesian Democracy He also noted that while acknowledging 
the problematic nature of the “traditionalist” versus “modernist” labels, he continue to use them largely 
because they are the most common labels used by Indonesian Muslims to self-identify, but also because 
they continue to signify very real sociological and even theological differences. “Modernist” denotes 
urban-based Muslims, who refer only to the Qur’an and hadith for divine guidance, while “traditionalist” 
sees potential for having, “mediating institutions in which citizens develop habits of free 
speech, participation, and toleration.”184 
In 1984 at NU’s Situbondo Muktamar (National Congress), Abdurrahman Wahid 
was elected to chair the Taufidziah, the administrative body governing NU. Under his 
leadership, NU withdrew from the PPP (United Development Party) and thus withdrew 
from formal politics altogether in a historic move called “Kembali ke Khittah 26” (Return 
to Khittah 26).185 
NU is neither a purely religious nor a purely political organization, but a complex 
mixture of both. As illustrated by its maneuverability, NU occupies a position outside of 
the formal political system from which it was able to develop a discourse on critical civil 
society. Wahid began to develop a discourse of civil rights, human rights, and democratic 
values. The so-called “training” and seminars were held at villages, which were actually 
political educations, which for the first time, most of the participants had ever 
experienced, and they effectively became a grassroots mobilization tool for political 
participation. Later, as momentum for Suharto’s overthrow was increasing, these local 
and newly ‘trained’ activists became important agents for reform and eventually 
participated directly in ensuring what some called Indonesia’s first “free and fair” 
elections in 1999.186          
Modernist and neo-modernist Muslim thinkers, on the other hand, articulated a 
view of civil society which focused more on fostering values of tolerance, pluralism, and 
rationalism, but which did not necessarily see civil society as separate from, and certainly 
not always oppositional to, the state.187     
                                                 
refers to largely rural-based Muslims, who adhere to decisions of ulama from the classical era, as handed 
down within four primary madhhab, or schools of jurisprudence, Ohio State University, May 11-12, 2001.     
184 Ibid. Robert W. Hefner, p. 13. 
185 Ibid. According to Robin Bush’s presentation paper, Khittah 26 was composed of nine points 
which laid out NU’s religious purpose, the theological tenets upon which its purpose was based, its social 
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politicians since 1952 and during the 1970s had been perceived by the New Order regime as oppositional, 
and thus had been ‘punished’ by the regime through the cutting off of funding, bureaucratic appointments, 
and other governmental ‘favors’. This caused a fair amount of economic hardship for the organization in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Ohio State University, May 11-12, 2001.  
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Commenting on the New York Times about the growing militancy of Muslims in 
Indonesia, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla said that, “this is a small slice of the Muslim community 
in Indonesia. But sometimes, the media to symbolize the whole community in Indonesia 
or in any country, though it is a small sample captures this kind of Islam”. This was 
exemplified by the fall of Suharto’s New Order in May 1998, which was accompanied by 
a proliferation of new political parties, many of which were Islamist. There are some fifty 
Muslim parties and organizations and only two have distinguished themselves through 
the persistent use of violence, the Front Pembela Islam (FPI- the Islamic Defender 
Front)188 and the Lasykar Jihad.189  He reaffirmed that 
The dominant feeling in Indonesia is more pluralistic, more tolerant, and 
more liberal. The 1999 election demonstrated that political support for 
militant, conservative Muslims in the political arena is very limited. The 
fact that support for the Islamic parties was less than 15% and that even 
devout Muslims supported the secular parties, is evidence to the numerical 
strength of the moderates. This is further illustrated by 33% of the vote to 
Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle (PDI-P), which is nationalist and 
secular”.190  
Ulil Abshar-Abdalla also highlighted that 
There was an idea of conducting a course in Jogyakarta where young 
activists, both university students and mass-based activists, learn about 
“Transformative Islam”. This is particularly so, after post-Suharto 
Indonesia, whereby it is becoming a country of demonstration practically 
everyday in almost every city. The objective is to educate the activists 
about how to use Islam as a new foundation for dealing with social issues 
like injustice, military repression, and religious and ethnic intolerance.191 
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state as a way to resolve many of the current socio-economic problems. It also sees itself as a defender of 
Muslim rights in the Eastern part of Indonesia. (Source: Ibid, Lt. General Agus Widjojo Pacific 
Symposium, February 20-21, 2002)   
189 Ibid. Lasykar Jihad is a paramilitary organization formed in February 1999 in response to the 
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This “training”, like the one assigned to Ulil Abshar, focused more on issues such 
as human rights from a Muslim perspective; arguing the compatibility between 
democracy and Islam; and calling for religious tolerance and pluralism. These messages 
were all conveyed from the perspectives of fiqh (law).192  
Another dimension to the civil society discourse described above is related to 
intra-Islamic relations. “NU kultural” (NU cultural) which Wahid promoted stood in 
opposition to “NU politik” (NU politics), or those who wished NU to return to formal 
politics. The central missions of NU cultural was to promote Islam as a religious, social 
and moral force in society and to oppose its use for political reasons as well as to oppose 
the formalization of Islam within the political system. Furthermore, they called for a 
practice of Islam as a tolerant religion co-existing with other religions, and rejected 
legalistic or fundamentalist expressions of Islam.193 
The call for “Islam Kultural” became identified with NU as an organization, and 
put it directly in opposition with the modernist and Islamist groups referred to as “Islam 
Politik”. These would include segments of Muhammadiyah, DDII (Dewan Dakwah 
Islamiyah Indonesia or Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication), Persis (Persatuan 
Islam or Muslim Unity Organization), and political parties PBB (Moon and Crescent 
Party) and PK (Justice Party) among others. Between the groups of “Islam Politik”, the 
Muhammadiyah is the most influential.          
 
2. Muhammadiyah 
Early in the 20th century, a group of young scholars came home from their Islamic 
study in Mecca with a new, more puritan understanding of their religion, and a strong 
will to reform religious practices among their fellow Muslims whom they regarded as 
heretical, mystical or superstitious. Their reformist activities led to the establishment of 
sed organization for Islamic reformation, the Indonesia’s first mass-ba
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Muhammadiyah.194 Supported today by almost 30 million members, many of whom are 
well-educated urbanites, the organization has been a training ground for many Indonesian 
leaders.195 
In the early 1990s, a young leader of Muhammadiyah, Mohammad Amien Rais, 
broke a political taboo by proposing to discuss plans for President Suharto’s succession at 
a time when Suharto himself had announced no such plans.196 Being challenged directly, 
the New Order leader mobilized his supporters in the Muslim community against Amien 
Rais. Almost overnight, Amien Rais, an American trained political scientist who had 
often been perceived as anti-American, anti-Jewish, and anti-Christian, attracted a lot of 
sympathizers and supporters from many non-Muslim groups in addition to his fellow 
Muhammadiyah members.197  
With the new wind of change blowing, Amien Rais created a political party in 
1998 called Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) to mobilize popular support from different 
ethno religious groups. This new party allied a mass base of Muhammadiyah Muslims 
with smaller groupings of Catholics, Christians, Hindus, Chinese, secular middle-class 
activists and urban reformist youth groups.198 
The party embarked on a new approach to politics, raising controversial issues 
such as proposing amendments to the ‘sacred’ 1945 constitution and called for a federal 
system of government in place of the existing unitary system.199 The party failed to live 
up to expectation in the June 1999 elections when it came in fifth among the forty-eight 
contending parties. However, an opinion poll indicated that many respondents preferred 
Amien Rais as a presidential candidate to their own respective party leaders. 
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Nevertheless, many observers still express doubts about his entourage of Muslim advisers 
and the sincerity of his pluralist commitments.200  
 
D. ISLAM AND THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES 
In late 1958, while President Sukarno was speaking of the need for a “guided 
democracy” based on “Indonesian values”, then, Army Chief of Staff, Major General 
Abdul Haris Nasution, was outlining a policy whereby the military would operate as both 
a military and sociopolitical force. Nasution’s “middle way” came to be known as 
“dwifungsi” or the “two functions” in the New Order period.201 Prior and after its 
dwifungsi, the Indonesian Armed Forces or Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, National 
Armed Forces of Indonesia)202 was and still is a significant player on the Indonesian 
social and political scene.203 
Relations between Islam and the Indonesian Armed Forces have always been 
problematic. Many reasons can be offered to explain the troubled, and sometimes 
mutually suspicious relationship.204 First, some in the military elite have been unhappy 
with what they regard as the factious and rebellious nature of the Islamic community. 
Specifically, the military elite has suspected that Islam has been a motivating force in 
regional rebellions in West Java, Aceh,205 and South Sulawesi. Second206, the military 
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205 In Aceh, during the 1989 and 1990, a series of violent incidents occurred, allegedly carried out by 
a militant ethno-nationalist group. The Indonesian military called this group the “Gerombolan Pengacau 
Keamanan” (GPK), Gang of Security Disturbers. Most local people simply referred to this group as 
“Gerakan Aceh Merdeka” (GAM) or the Free Aceh Movement lead by Hasan di Toro. Between 1989-1993 
the Indonesian Armed Forces mounted an intensive counter-insurgency operation against GAM. Their 
methods included extra judicial executions, disappearances, unacknowledged military detention, torture, 
and unfair political trials. The precise human rights toll of these counter-insurgency operations will never 
be known. Some thought that the so-called GPK violence in Aceh was engineered by certain elements 
within the Indonesian military as a provocation to justify a campaign of terror. Another possibility was that 
leadership has tended to be dominated by either the abangan Javanese or secular 
nationalist and therefore, obsessed with its role as the guardian of national unity in an 
ethnically and religiously diverse society. They tended to regard attempts by Muslims to 
express political interests through protests on economic and cultural grievances with 
hostility. Third,207 in terms of power politics, the military was inclined to deny a formal 
role to Islam during the New Order system of government out of concern that it would 
challenge its prominent position as an integralist based upon Pancasila and its dwifungsi 
(dual function).     
 
1. Schism in TNI 
During the 10 years leading up to the New Order, the military had slowly 
expanded its power by, among other things, doing battle against what it called forces of 
the “extreme Left” (communist) and the “extreme Right” (Muslim separatist).208 Despite 
the projection of united armed forces, Sulistiyo pointed out that 
The abortive left-wing officers’ coup of October 1, 1965 was, in one 
sense, the culmination of political battles between PKI and the army. It 
also represented the culmination of factional conflicts within the armed 
forces themselves, between left and right, and, more generally, between 
factions distinguished by ethnicity, religion, and ties to different political 
parties.209 
Under Suharto, to overcome such ethno-religious divides among the military, the 
government implemented policies prohibiting any political or social activity based on 
SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras, Antara Golongan or ethnic, religion, racial and inter-group 
relations) were adapted to the armed forces. As mentioned by Sulistiyo  
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On the basis of concern like this, there was unwritten rule that an officer 
with a Batak ethnic background, for example, would not be assigned to 
serve as a regional commander (Kodam) of North Sumatra, the home of 
the Bataks. At lower levels of the military hierarchy, too, there were tour-
of-duty programs that were intended to reduce the potential for ethno-
religious sentiments becoming divisive influences inside the TNI.210 
However, in interviews conducted by Sulistiyo, “many officers expressed the 
feeling that religious issues, rather than ethnicity, have recently played a more troubling 
role in the armed forces.”211 This was especially true in the late 1980s when Suharto 
started to use Islamic symbols. In fact, in December 1990, Suharto open the first national 
conference of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), headed by B. J. 
Habibie, thus effectively erasing his abangan label and the perception of increasing 
Muslim participation in elite politics. This inclination also influences the military top 
ranking officers that started to use Islam as a rallying cry to increase their support in the 
army itself as opposed to the nationalists. Among them, known as the “green generals”, 
were Feisal Tanjong, Hartono, Syarwan Hamid, and Prabowo who comprised the 
ascendant “Islamic” wing of the armed forces. As Hefner pointed out, “the Islam they 
supported was not that of Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, or the majority of 
Indonesian Muslims, but Suharto-dependent “regimist” Islam.”212  
Thus, within TNI, factional tensions grew especially between the “green” 
(regimist Islam) on one wing and a “red-and white” nationalist wing on the other. The 
Center for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS) was set up with the intention, “to 
become the leading think tank for regimist Islam and to serve as the bridge between ICMI 
regimists and military greens.”213 In fact, the regimist and ultra-conservatives Muslims 
under the direction of “green generals” were accused of masterminding the attack on PDI 
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(Indonesian Democratic Party) Headquarters on July 27, 1996. This incident was seen as 
the initial scene that culminates with the downfall of Suharto in 1998. 
 
2. TNI as the Kingmaker 
In 1998, General Wiranto, seen as leading the “red-and white” camp, was 
promoted to commander of the armed forces. His first crucial test was, “triggered by the 
fatal shootings of students by army special forces at Trisakti University on May 12, 1998 
followed by massive and bloody riots the following two days in five other Indonesian 
cities.”214 The riots also took an ugly twist when they took on an anti-Chinese character. 
As Sulistiyo elaborates 
The sudden shift in the focus of the riots – from political and economic to 
ethno-religious issues – showed once and for all that the New Order had 
seriously failed in its efforts to redirect racial, ethnic, and religious 
tensions. Resentment on the part of indigenous people toward a few 
wealthy Chinese linked to the military and civilian elite clearly contributed 
to the violence.215  
General Wiranto moved carefully to replace or reassign “green generals” 
immediately after the resignation of Suharto. Besides the internal problems, the 
transitional period also called for TNI to deal with violent ethno-religious conflicts in the 
“dukun (sorcerers) killings”216, the “Ketapang incident”217, Ambon218, and West 
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Kalimantan 219. Popular beliefs say that active or retired military personnel designed the 
conflict for political purposes. TNI’s imaged was tarnished by human rights abuses 
claimed by the various international human rights organizations. In fact the recently 
released 2001 country reports on “Human Rights Practices” by the US Department of 
State further amplified the accusations of human rights abused by TNI and the recently 
breakaway police department.220 East Timor presented the most troubling case of all. 
Soon after Habibie took power, Indonesia presented its plan for granting greater 
autonomy to East Timor. Pro-independence activists in East Timor saw the potential 
turmoil in the Indonesian capital as a golden opportunity to finally achieve their goal. 
After mass violence and an estimated 200,000 deaths, the East Timorese won their 
referendum for independence in 1999 and this provincial separation signifies to many that 
the “balkanization” process of Indonesia is about to begin.  
When Wahid was elected President, he attempted to dismantle the army’s hold as 
kingmaker in Indonesian politics. However, towards his final days before impeachment, 
he reverted to the old hard line tactics used by Suharto, “in a last ditch attempt to hold on 
to his job, he declared a state of emergency ordering parliament dissolved immediately 
and calling for elections next year.”221 Again, when troops moved into place outside the 
palace in a show of support for the people and not President Wahid, during the 
impeachment, TNI was key in deciding the country’s destiny. Remarks by Juwono 
Sudarsono, a former Defense Minister under Wahid summed it up as 
It is the politicians who have allowed the army to play the role of 
kingmaker, and only the politicians can rein the army in. The civilians 
have not got their act together, have not built a party system based on 
organized collective behavior, and they have lacked decision-making.222  
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E. ISLAMIC POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
There are abundant resources in Muslim traditions for democratic politics but for 
these raw materials to become effective democratic “environmental and internal inputs”, 
Muslims thinkers and scholars have to be willing to learn from their own history. 
Historically, politics in Indonesia has often made this delicate balance of religious 
idealism and political empiricism a difficult achievement indeed. Even though Islamic 
societies of modernist thoughts have tried to overcome this obstacle, the population as a 
whole has a long way to go to reach this destination. Promoting Arab Islam as more 
authentic than Indonesian Islam is neither pursuing a global nor a regional Southeast 
Asian Islamic agenda.     
 
1. Democratic Transition 
The unraveling of Suharto’s New Order was accompanied by the flare-up of 
ethnic and religious violence across Indonesia.223 Added to that is the fear of impending 
chaos, anarchy and national disintegration being fuelled by the independence of East 
Timor and separatist sentiment not only in West Papua, and Aceh but in such untroubled 
place as Riau. On another level, the establishment of political and social organizations 
overtly premised on ethnic and religious allegiances is giving rise to fears about the 
reemergence of old political divides, especially those of ethnicity, religion, and ideology 
known a generation ago as aliran (lit. stream).224 
As demonstrated in 1973, the MPR in opposition to organized Islam, imposed 
new regulations with restrictions to polygamy, gave women greater rights in divorce than 
recognized under Islamic law, and moved most of the authority for marriage and divorce 
out of Islamic courts.  The New Order thus appeared to be moving away from its early 
position toward a secular modernist posture. Principle always played second fiddle to 
power politics. Bypassing the secular parliamentarians who had sponsored the marriage 
arge of the negotiations with Muslim representatives over bill, military officials took ch                                                 
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the marriage law. They negotiated directly with representatives from Nahdlatul Ulama 
and the state-created Islamic political party, the PPP.225    
Again, during the 1970s and 1980s, tensions between organized Islam and the 
Suharto regime reflected age-old cultural conflicts. Suharto and the generals on whom he 
relied were brought up in a Hindu-Javanese milieu that made them more nominal 
(abangan) then practicing (santri) Muslims.226 
As illustrated in the middle of March 1992, three months prior to elections, just 
weeks after hosting a mass rally at a Jakarta stadium, attempts were made by Lieutenant 
Colonel Prabowo Subianto (Suharto’s son-in law) to persuade Wahid to endorse Suharto 
for another term of office. Although a showdown was averted, Prabowo’s message 
highlighted two realities as pointed out by Adam Schwarz of modern Indonesian politics, 
“First, Suharto is not ready for any political activity, no matter how mild and innocuous, 
outside his direct control. Second, that despite the New Order’s nearly three decade long 
campaign to neutralize civilian opposition, Islam is still considered a potent political 
force.”227 
The crackdown on the press in June 1994 marked the end of Suharto’s limited 
liberalization and the beginning of the Islamization process in Indonesia. The new 
policy’s intent was to neutralize the growing pro-democracy movement by mobilizing 
ultra-conservatives Muslims to his side. Regimist Muslims put into action plans to topple 
Wahid, the leader of NU, undermine Megawati and attempt to eliminate the alliance of 
“red and green” between Megawati and Wahid.228 All these events marked the return to 
the hard line tactics of the early New Order and indirectly endorsed Megawati as the 
leader of a revitalized pro-democracy movement. Meanwhile, Wahid and Nurcholish 
Madjid, the two outspoken leaders of the Muslim community, chose a long-term strategy 
of democratization. They chose to avoid violence and hoped to achieve this through the 
slogan “civil society” or “masyarakat madani”, a kinder and gentler road to democracy. 
The divide-and conquer strategy of Suharto’s rule was a tactical blunder when he chose 
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to back the ultra-conservatives Muslim rather than the majority moderates. Suharto’s 
supporters’ appeal to ethno religious hatred only stiffened the resolve of the great 
majority of Muslims leaders for democracy, nonviolence and the rule of the law.229  
 
2. Back to the Future 
The present president, Megawati, inherited a difficult task. As mentioned in the 
Far Eastern Economic Review 
Indonesia’s democratization since 1998 has opened politics to new players 
and new power centers but today, with the ruling elite trying to balance 
these elements without causing itself too much financial pain, it seems that 
the more things change, the more they stay the same. Corruption 
flourishes in new, inventive ways, there is no functioning structure to 
penalize wrongdoing, economic and legal reform is at a standstill and 
businessmen are still refusing to repay debts. Indeed, more than 3 years 
after Suharto’s downfall, there is little fundamental difference in how 
Indonesia’s 210 million people are being governed.230  
In fact, there are elites who recalled as an afterthought, the good things, such as 
stability from the New Order. Stability is something Indonesians want after years of 
political turmoil and communal violence.231 One of the more unusual aspects of 
Indonesian political history is the fact that democratic socialists, not market liberals, were 
the primary carriers of the liberal-democratic ideals of freedom, and equality to the 
Indonesian public.232     
 
3. US/Indonesia Relations 
As related by Kingsbury and Burchill 
Following the visit by US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, security issues in the East Asian region are 
much clearer. A widespread belief that Indonesia is edging towards 
disintegration should now be laid to rest. It has become a truism of 
secessionism that, to be successful, it often requires the support of an 
active external sponsor as exemplified by Panama from Colombia 
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(supported by US), Bangladesh from Pakistan (India), Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia (US and NATO), and East Timor (Portugal and the United 
Nations).233  
By the same token, the “balkanization” process in Indonesia also needs external 
support. The only country that has the capacity to meaningfully support secession is the 
United States. To do this, as Kingsbury noted, “the US would need to be convinced that 
its strategic and economic interests were best served by such a political separation.”234 
For many countries, considerations of morality and decency were outweighed by the 
profits to be had from close economic ties with Indonesia and its huge population. As 
gushed by the president of Coca-Cola in 1992, “ When I think of Indonesia, a country on 
the equator with 180 million people, a median age of 18, and a Muslim ban on alcohol, I 
feel like I know what heaven looks like.”235 
On his recent visit to Indonesia, Rumsfeld said that he would like to see renewed 
military aid to Indonesia’s armed forces, the TNI. This is despite a lack of meaningful 
reform of the TNI. The reason for U.S. support of the TNI is simply because the Bush 
administration has decided that, as a part of its renewed focus on East Asia, the unity of 
Indonesia serves a greater strategic purpose.236        
 
F. CONCLUSION 
Suharto did guide Indonesia to considerable economic growth. However, the final 
decade of his 32-year rule, which ended with his resignation in 1998, turned Indonesia 
into Asia’s emblem of corruption and decadence, of a government for profit of a 
privileged few. Suharto’s immediate successor, B. J. Habibie, was left with the task of 
beginning a process of democratic reform. He freed the press, opened the door to new 
political parties, and albeit under duress, agreed to hold new parliamentary elections in 
June 1999.237 There were high expectations that AbdurrahmanWahid, who took office in 
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October 1999, would bring political and economic reform. However, in two years he 
changed from being the one man who could command a coalition of political support, to 
the one man who could unite Indonesia’s politicians in opposing him. 
Megawati began her term in office with great promise by appointing well-
regarded economic ministers, the “dream team”. Unfortunately, this team already shows 
signs of paralysis because it is largely due to the lack of political will on the part of the 
president. As Sarwono Kusumaadmadja, a former cabinet minister under both Suharto 
and Wahid commented, “It’s the New Order without the leadership and without the 
vision.”238  What has changed is the way power has become distributed between a 
diminished presidency, a newly empowered Parliament as seen in the impeachment of the 
former President Wahid, and the influence it now wields over legislation, and a reduced 
military role, that for the moment, is content to take a political back seat.  However, the 
press is one of the freest in the region. The undercurrents will be strong in the years ahead 
as the three power centers struggle to strike a balance and because of the resurgence of 
the Islamic parties maneuvering for the 2004 elections.  
Megawati Sukarnoputri is unlikely to be the kind of leader to single-handedly pull 
Indonesia out of its economic and social morass.239 In fact, given her unpopularity 
amongst traditional Muslims, Megawati is seem as a short-term leader, beholden to the 
armed forces for her new position. A moderate but more devout Muslim from one of the 
many civil Islamic organizations or parties will probably be the future president in 2004.  
Professor Abootalebi in his article wrote 
The prospect for the emergence of civil society depends on the 
characteristics of the people who form that society in the first place. The 
better educated, healthier, wealthier, and more organized the people, and 
the more broadly these resources are spread, the stronger will the society 
be in protecting itself from domination by the state. Moreover, these 
resources allow for the formation of institutions that act as the focus of 
activity where differences in opinions and policies can be debated and 
resolved without resort to violence.”240 Obviously, this principle does not 
fit into Suharto’s “divide and conquer strategy”.  
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240 Ali R. Abootalebi, “Islam, Islamist, and Democracy,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 
Thus, Abootalebi continues 
Institutionalization is essential for political stability, for systematic, 
orderly channeling of contesting elites’ demands for political leadership. 
To be democratic, political parties, whether religious or not, must function 
within an independent institutionalized organizational network where final 
decisions are made and executed without constant interference from 
various layers of their country’s state bureaucracies.241  
This is exemplified in the case of Indonesian whereby the government’s 
institutions and cronies directly or indirectly interfered with civil societies, political 
parties, the independent press organization and TV networks during the Old Order, New 
Order and also during Wahid’s era.     
Indonesian’s example, and in particular, the influence of NU and Muhammadiyah 
make clear that democracy depends not just on the state but also on cultures and 
organizations in society as a whole. As Hefner pointed out 
not all organizations in society are civil as demonstrated by the vigilantes 
and hate groups, and the state must act as a guardian of public civility. 
Independent courts and watchdog is needed if some citizen or official tries 
to replace democratic procedurals with nether-world violence. The key to 
democracy is not singular but multiple and builds on strategic 
interventions at many points in the democratic circle: civil associations, a 
free press and judiciary, the egalitarian diffusion of wealth and 
opportunity, and public support for citizens and leaders committed to these 
goals. There is no one size fits all democracy. For examples gender and 
family roles, community and individuality, public and private, and rights 
and duties change over time. Freedom, equality, and pluralism are 
generalized values. Muslim democrats may prefer a stronger commitment 
to public moral education than Western liberals.242 
In fact, the Muslim community in Indonesia will see a gradual “santrification” of 
Indonesian society that is the process of nominal Muslims becoming more devout. 
By the same token, as highlighted by Lt. General Agus, “civilian and military 
leaders have discussed the need for greater military professionalism. Reassigning the 
military from a “guardian of the nation” role to an “instrument of national defense” role 
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within a parliamentary context that represents the most fundamental challenge to 
reforming governance and delineating state structures.”243 Obviously the transferring of 
the responsibility of internal security to the recently separated national police and various 
functional institutions requires time to prepare these institutions, and thus to truly get 
away from the image of human rights abuses and the shadow of the military of the past.  
Modernity has witnessed powerful religious revivals, which is not a reaction 
against but a creative response to the modern world.  Hefner had three responses: state 
conquest, separatist isolation or accept the diversity of public voices and acknowledge the 
nature of modern things.244 Hefner further indicates, “that the democratization process 
depends not just on formal elections and constitutions but also on a delicate interaction 
between society and the state. Democracy requires a civic organization characterized by 
voluntarism, independent associations, and a balance of powers between state and society 
as well as among civil organizations themselves.”245 The real key to democracy’s cross-
cultural appeal is not imitation or westernization but dialogue and contextualization.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Islam is a religion of peace and moderation. However, after the September 11 
attacks, with global media attention given to the religion of Islam and the attackers that 
happened to be Muslims, the Western perception of Islam appears to be militant and 
radical. This perception is registered despite other terrorist groups that have been in 
existence for so long in various parts of this world. Sadly, as the PM of Malaysia Dr. 
Mahathir said, “it is not because of the teachings of Islam but the interpretations made by 
those apparently learned in Islam to suit their patrons or their own vested interest.”246 
Unfortunately, it is this radical few that receives full media attention to project the 
misunderstanding of Islam, the religion of peace and tolerance.     
With globalization and democratization as the rule of the game today, both Sunni 
and Shi’i scholars have in recent years provided a framework and developed distinctive 
political theories that are self-described and conceived as being democratic using the 
absolute sovereignty and oneness of God as expressed in the concept of tawhid and the 
role of human beings as defined in the concept of khilafah. They involve special 
definitions and recognition of popular sovereignty, and an important emphasis on the 
equality of human beings and the obligations of the people to be the bearers of the trust of 
the government. Esposito and Voll emphasize, “Although these perspectives may not fit 
into the limits of a Western based definitions of democracy, they represent important 
perspectives in the contemporary global context of democratization”.247 
Muslims are always the lovers of justice. As Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush said 
Adl (justice) is the floor, as it were, as ethics and ihsan (generosity) is the 
ceiling. Thus, ethics lies between the two limits of justice and generosity. 
If Muslims cannot attain ihsan, then they must at least strive to implement 
‘adl in society.248   
                                                 
246 PM Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, “Deviant Muslims’ Threat of Overthrowing Moderate Malaysia,” 
Speech delivered at the World Economic Forum (WEF), Waldorf Astoria, New York, January, 31 to 
February 4, 2002.  
247 Ibid. Esposito and Voll, p. 27. 
248 Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush, “Reason and Freedom in Islamic Thought,” Second Annual CSID 
Conference, a Keynote Address, Published by the CSID, Washington DC, Volume 4, No. 1, January, 2002   
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Muslims need to familiarize themselves with the theories of justice, but Muslims 
must not forget that justice varies from time and place. They must figure out how justice 
is to be attained in modern times under the conditions of modern life. In the past, the 
focus of political theory was exclusively on the existence of a just ruler. A just society 
was assumed to result inexorably from the presence and leadership of a just ruler, and 
nothing more needed to be done beyond giving leadership to this person. However, times 
have changed. Emphasis must now be shifted from the lone leader to institutions, laws, 
and processes. Therefore, basing upon the general direction as evidence in the Qur’an, the 
institutions, laws and processes can then be interpreted into a political system of Islam 
using Mawdudi’s, Tawheed (Oneness of God), Risalat (Prophet hood) and Khilafat 
(Caliphate) or Sheikh Taha’s Islamic values of, Tawheed (Oneness of God), Tazkiy’ah 
(purification of the human being), and Imr’an (building a civilization with values). Thus, 
Islam is compatible with democracy depending upon how it is interpreted to fit into the 
various molds of the democratic principles.    
Islam hierarchical setup differs from the other monotheistic religions of Judaism 
and Christianity because it has no system for priests. Muslim discards this system of 
priests simply because historically Muslims believed that the Hebrew and Christian 
priests had changed the original contents of their religions and do not want the same to 
happen to Islam. However, over the centuries those learned in Islam, the ulama, gained 
such authority over the Muslim laity that many of them tended to use their considerable 
influence to gain power for themselves. They became like the priests of other religions. 
Critically commented by Dr. Mahathir 
The early ulamas were knowledgeable in many disciplines besides Islamic 
theology. Today’s political ulamas are only knowledgeable about those 
parts of the teachings of Islam, which seemingly support their political 
views. Many misinterpret and distort Islam in order to legitimize their 
political creed. The favorite is that only ulamas may rule a country, 
democracy notwithstanding.249  
The globalization process brings with it Islamic resurgence. The newly educated 
Muslims, with borderless worlds, computerization, and an abundance of knowledge, 
unlimited access to everyone from everywhere, have awakened to new thoughts. Early 
                                                 
249 Ibid. PM Dr. Mahathir’s speech at WEF, January 31 to February 4, 2002. 
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Muslims were great scholars excelling in mathematics and the sciences but some political 
ulamas rejected knowledge that was not specifically religious for fear that such people 
might challenge their authority. This is particularly so as evidenced by the Islamic 
organizations mushrooming in the world. In Malaysia, the Sisters-in-Islam (SIS), 
International for Just World (JUST) and Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in 
Indonesia are a few such modernist civil societies of new Islamic resurgence 
organizations.  
In Malaysia, Islamic parties are allowed to function within the framework of the 
political system and they now form the main opposition to the present government. With 
the intent of making Malaysia an Islamic state, the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), 
won two states in the last election in 1999. However, basing the party’s objective only on 
the Muslims votes will cause the vision to just remain a vision unfulfilled. A moderate 
and controversial PM Dr. Mahathir with his “autho-democratic rule” and his Barisan 
National (BN) will be in power for a few more years. His deputy, a moderate Muslim, 
hopefully will take over the premiership in due time. As for the opposition Barisan 
Alternatif (BA), it will remain just a credible opposition force, unless a compromise is 
reached on the various divergences of the parties’ ideologies. By the same token, civil 
societies of Islamic aura will flourish in Malaysia and remain influential associations that 
will infringe into the exclusive domain of ulama in interpreting the Qur’an to new 
heights.  
Meanwhile in Indonesia, the two most influential Muslim organizations, the 
traditionalist NU and modernist Muhammadiyah, have extensive influence and play an 
active role in the alliance and coalition with the other political forces. President Megawati 
inherited a nation in turmoil and with perseverance she will be able to stabilize the nation 
collectively with her able cabinet and the total support of the armed forces. With the 
“santrification” wave of devout Muslims that is sweeping Indonesia currently, the future 
President could be a moderate male Muslim from one of the large civil organizations or 
political parties. Megawati will just be a short-term president while Indonesia is 
recovering from unending ethno-religious and ethnic conflicts that will subside without 
the support of TNI, the main key player. However, ethnic and ethno-religious skirmishes 
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will still occur on a much more smaller scale just like anywhere else in this world that is 
plurally and culturally diverse as is Indonesia. 
The problem facing the Muslim countries today is mainly due to deviations from 
Islamic fundamentals. As PM Mahathir stressed 
People are fond of equating fundamentalist with fanatical and extreme 
orthodoxy. Fundamentals of Islam are simple, basic and good. If Muslims 
stick to the fundamentals of Islam they would not be divided into a 
multitude of different sects, race and nations each claiming to be the true 
Muslims or more Muslims than the others. If Muslims return to the 
fundamentals of Islam, Muslim nations would be well administered by 
trained and skilful people and would be able to compete within the global 
community. Islam is not just a religion. It is a way of life. It should bring 
about peace, stability, and success. It is a way of life, which does not 
neglect spiritual values. It is a way of life, which can bring greatness to the 
followers of Islam, as it once did.250  
An acceptable way to resolve political differences in Islam without resorting to 
violence and intimidation is through dialogue, debate and discussions. Only when 
Muslims start to contribute their share of modernization achievements, learn to live with 
differences of opinions, encourage diversity, and benefit from the opinions and 
experiences of others, will the communities of Muslims be movers of the world again.    
 
                                                 
250 Ibid. PM Dr. Mahathir’s Speech at WEF, January 31 to February 4, 2002.  
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